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Based on Schumpeterian model, new models are constructed to analyse growth 
rates of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs and their innovation strategies. Average growth 
rates of each type firms are divided into two parts: (1) increase rates of each type 
firms’ scale; (2) technology-led growth rates. The order of average growth rates 
of each type firms is determined by whether their superiorities in some 
determinants of growth rates could prevail over their inferiorities in other 
determinants. And proportion in total production of firms with the highest 
growth rate increases over time, whilst proportion of firms with the lowest 
growth rate decreases over time. Proportion of firms with medium growth rate 
decreases over time if the difference between the highest growth rate and the 
medium growth rate is larger than the difference between the medium growth 
rate and the lowest growth rate. In terms of innovation strategy, at the early stage 
of development, imitating advanced technology from technology frontier is a 
better choice than undertaking R&D activities for each type firms. For one certain 
type firms, if the required least advantage in technology research capability to 
cover per unit of differences in technology gap can be satisfied, the imitation rate 
of this type firms is lower. In addition, if technology-led growth rates of each type 
firms are up to a certain level and innovation research capability could satisfy the 
lowest requirement, imitation rates will decrease in order to improve 
technology-led growth rates. Based on the model with endogenous step size of 
technology improvements, trends of preferences of imitating advanced 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
In last 30 years, China has experienced miraculous economic growth, however, 
the sustainability of this growth is questioned because of its lower growth in 
factor productivities (Krugman, 1999). In fact, after maintaining the highest 
economic growth in the world for 30 years, China now is considered to be 
entering the ‘New Normal’ by officials, which means that China’s economic 
growth is at a medium-high speed rather than previous high speed. The 
economic reform is regarded as a new engine of China’s economic development 
in ‘New Normal’ in the Report on the Work of the Government 2014. In fact, 
economic reform began China’s high-speed economic growth 30 years ago. 
 
The privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is an important part of 
China’s economic reform that happened in third phase (after mid-1990s) (Liu, 
2010). In this phase, the policy ‘grasping the large and letting go of the small’ was 
implemented. SOEs in less important sectors and small SOEs were privatised. 
However, in strategic sectors, SOEs function as an indirect tool that allows the 
government to manage the economy through their market power. Large SOEs 
dominate the domestic market and are more competitive in the worldwide 
market (Eilliot and Zhou, 2013; Hsueh, 2011).  
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In general, privatisation is one of three core concepts of the fundamental 
institutional reform that caused China’s high economic growth (Xu, 2011). 
Private enterprises (PEs) have greater productivity than SOEs (Jefferson et al., 
2000; Sachs and Woo, 1997; Plane, 1992, 1997; Su, 2006) and play an important 
role in China’s economic growth (Allen et al., 2005; Huang, 2008). And in the 
same time, SOEs still contribute a lot to China’s economy because of their 
externality effects.1  
 
Nowadays, China’s government is preparing for the second reform of SOEs. In the 
Jinlin Province in 2014, President Xi Jinping provided standards for judging the 
reform of SOEs which are known as ‘three benefits to’: (1) maintaining and 
increasing the value of state-owned capital to society; (2) increasing the 
competitiveness of SOEs; (3) enhancing the effects of state-owned capital on 
society. According to the ‘three benefits to’ standards, the objective of the second 
SOE reform is to improve the competitiveness of SOEs in the market, particularly 
the international market, and increase their effects on China.  
 
Another important impact of the ‘New Normal’ is that China’s economy is 
increasingly driven by innovation, which is gradually replacing blind input and 
investment. The importance of innovation to economic growth is stressed by the 
government in official occasions. There is a trend in China of transitioning from 
1 Such as Ram, 1986; Jefferson, 1998; Jalilian and Weiss, 1997; Doamekpor, 1998: Bai et al., 2000, 2006; Lin 
et al., 1998, 2003; Hirschman, 1958; Holz, 2011. 
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imitation to innovation (Guan et al., 2009).  
 
But in terms of firm level, the strategies for technology improvement of SOEs and 
PEs are different because of their ownership. The government and firms innovate 
for different reasons. The government cares more about the long-term influence 
of technology while enterprises chase short-term profit (Chang et al., 2006). 
Therefore, due to state-owned ownership, SOEs more prefer to undertake more 
R&D activities compared to PEs, and SOEs have benefits to encourage R&D 
activities and improve technology (Choi et al., 2011; Guan et al., 2009). 
 
Because of China’s unique historic and political characteristics, the impact of 
ownership cannot be ignored and it is necessary to analyse its effects on 
economic growth. And this thesis focus on impacts of technology improvements 
on China’s economy.  
 
In fact, production factor inputs especially capital inputs are a main engine of 
China’s growth in past 30 years. However, now China enters into ‘New Normal’, 
which means China’s economy will grow in mid-high speed rather than high seed 
as before. And China will gradually change itself from investment-driven 
economy to innovation driven economy. In other words China want to develop 
itself as innovative economy. Innovation will be a key factor that could determine 
 3 
whether China can keep a significant growth in long term.2 Therefore, base on 
China’s reality, the study about which factors can influence research activities 
and growth of firms in China are important.  
 
In addition, this thesis does not model the impacts of human capital 
accumulation directly. But it does not mean that this thesis neglect the impacts. 
With the accumulation of human capital, the investment in labour increase and 
gradually, China is no longer competitive in cheap labour. And some 
labour-intensive industries are moved from China to Southeast Asia such as 
Indonesia. China has a motivation to update its economy structure, from 
labour-intensive and capital-intensive to technology-intensive. And human 
capital accumulation could positive influence step size of technology and 
effectiveness of research activities, which could affect technology improvements, 
and thus the growth of outputs.  
 
The most novelty of this thesis is that this thesis, not as previous studies which 
discuss impacts of ownership and size effect separately, consider the ownership 
and size effect together in the model: firms in China are divided into three types, 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), large private enterprises (LPEs) and 
small-medium private enterprises (SMEs).  
 
2 China government work report in 2014,2015 and 2016 
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In addition the economic growths of these three types of firms are divided into 
two parts: (1) the growth rate of employees and (2) the growth rate of 
productivity, also known as the technology improvement causing growth rate. 
Imitating advanced technology and undertaking R&D activities could both lead to 
increases in the technology improvement causing growth rate. In the following 
chapters this structure will be used to discuss economic growth.  
 
There are three main research questions in this thesis: 
(1) Which factors will determine the growths of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs based on 
Schumpeterian model? 
(2) Which type of firms will grow most and what are the conditions? 
(3) For SOEs, LPEs and SMEs, how does the strategy of technology development, 
imitation or innovation, change over time? 
 
These research questions are answered in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6: 
 
In Chapter 4, based on the Schumpeterian model, the growths of SOEs and PEs in 
China are studied and compared. Due to discrimination against PEs in banking 
sector (Brandt and Li, 2003; Cull and Xu, 2003), financial friction is considered in 
the model. In addition, there are three types of firms in China market: SOEs, LPEs 
and SMEs. In comparison to SOEs, with the development of the banking sector, 
LPEs are also welcome in lending market (Firth et al., 2009). The final section of 
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this chapter discusses the contributions of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs to total 
production.  
 
Following Chapter 5, Chapter 6 focuses on the technology improvement causing 
the growth rate. It supposes that each type of firm must determine a strategy of 
technology development: imitating advanced technology or undertaking R&D 
activities. A model is constructed to describe the different strategies of SOEs and 
PEs. 
 
Chapter 6 is an extension of Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, the endogenous step size of 
technology improvements, trend of preference for imitation and the influence of 










Chapter 2 Background: China  
2.1 China’s Growth 
China is a germane case study of the impact of institutions on economic growth. 
China has experienced significant economic growth since the reforms dating 
from 1978. China’s reform is unique to that of Central and Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. Specifically, China did not endure radical political 
reform. Cogently with Acemoglu and Robinson (2002), domestic political 
pressure and international competition may bring about economic reform, as 
was the reason behind China commencing economic reform (reforming and 
opening-up policy).3  
 
Before 1979, China practiced the Soviet model of developing an economy 
(planned economy). The overt advantage of planned economy is that the 
government can mobilise the resources to develop priority sectors. Indeed, the 
industrialisation of China has benefited from planned economy. However, it 
cannot be denied that Soviet-style economy is inefficient because (1) 
comparative advantages are not granted sufficient attention when determining 
industrial structure; (2) managers cannot motivate workers to improve their 
3 During the rule of Mao Zedong, China had achieved much with the economy (for example the first 
‘five-year plan’). Indeed, these achievements, such as the state-owned enterprises founded during this 
period and some significant projects in communications and transport, are the basis of China’s 
industrialisation. However, in The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, China is thought to have suffered 
losses in the economy by most researchers, including Li (1984). It was under these circumstances that China 
created the reforming and opening-up policy. 
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productivity. (Lin et al., 2003)  
 
In agriculture, ownership of rural areas transferred from commune system to 
household responsibility system (HRS). Lin (1992) researches this agricultural 
institutional system change in China, and the findings suggest that between 
1978-1984, the growth of agricultural outputs resulted from institutional change. 
 
The role of the government in economic reform is significant. Lin (1989) has 
emphasised that government policy plays an important role in economic growth. 
The government can provide the structural stability. Based on the structural 
stability, the economy can be effectively built, and there will be measured 
economic behaviour. A shrewd government is able to guide individuals’ 
investment motivation. The government offers an institutional arrangement that 
is a system, which successfully defines and protects the property rights in goods, 
production factors and intellectual property. Due to this kind of institutional 
arrangement, individuals are encouraged to seek profit opportunity. 
 
According to the research of Liu (2010), there are three phases in China’s 
economic reform. In the first period (1980s), individuals’ small businesses were 
allowed to open. In the second phase (completed by 1993), prices were 
determined by demand and supply. This period is called ‘price marketisation’. 
The third phase (since the mid-1990s) is the phase of state-owned enterprises’ 
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reform. In 19974, the government created the ‘grasping the large and letting go of 
the small’ policy. Moreover, large-size state-owned enterprises5 (SOEs) have 
market power in important industries in China, such as the railways, 
telecommunication, electricity, military and mineral industries6. Additionally, 
small state-owned enterprises have been privatised in various forms. 
 
Sachs and Woo (1997) summarise the theories explaining China’s fast economic 
growth after the economic reform in 1978. They argue that there are two schools: 
the experimentalist school and the convergence school. The experimentalist 
school attributes China’s economic growth to market reform, which leads to a 
unique China economic model. China is changing to a ‘socialist market economy 
with Chinese characteristics’ from planned economy. However, the 
experimentalist school is concerned that the reforms will cause more social 
instabilities and more inappropriate policies may be implemented due to less 
experiments. (Naughton, 1995; Rawski, 1994; Nolan and Ash, 1995; Lin et al., 
1994) The convergence school considers convergence with non-socialist market 
economies, especially those in East Asia. The coastal provinces (prosperous areas 
in China) have increased rapid growth compared to inner areas (poor areas in 
4 At the 15th National Congress of Chinese Communist Party the ‘grasping the large and letting go of the 
small’ policy was formulated. 
5 According to the definition of SOE in China, there are there types of SOEs. The first one is the state-owned 
individual proprietorship enterprises that the State owns 100% of the shares. The second one is 
state-holding enterprises that State owns more than 50% shares in or owns less than 50% but has more 
shares than other shareholders. The last one is state-joining enterprises that State holds less than 50% 
shares in and less shares than other shareholders. Most researches use the acronym SOEs to refer to the first 
two types.  
6 China Enterprise Confederation/China Enterprise Directors Association publishes the ‘China Top 500 
enterprises’ list every year. According to ‘China Top 500 enterprises in 2011’, there are 316 SOEs in Top 500. 
The ratio of SOEs is more than 60% with all of top 10 enterprises as SOEs. 
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China) because of the faster convergence and deeper market reform. Therefore, 
the experimentalist school prefers the gradualism strategy, while the 
convergence school does not favour gradualism. The convergence school tends to 
alter the economic structure and utilise the comparative advantages of China.  
 
Sachs et al. (2000) attempt to evaluate these two schools of thought via an 
empirical study of transition economies. They find that privatisation is not 
sufficient to improve the efficiency of public enterprises. The objectives of firms 
must reflect profit maximisation. The soft budget constraints should be changed 
to hard budget constraints, which means the government cuts the subsidies and 
tax alleviation for SOEs. Furthermore, managers can be effectively monitored and 
controlled by the owners of enterprises. Thus, enterprises can run with efficiency, 
and economic growth can be better promoted. 
 
The unique characteristics of China’s economic reform lie not so much in opening 
the market to the world as in the changes of ownership. Due to China’s former 
planned economy, despite private enterprise and other non-SOEs contributing a 
lot to economic growth, SOEs are still important for China, especially in 
capital-intensive industries. Since the SOEs’ reform in 1995, the government no 
longer directly controls and manages SOEs, however the government now is the 
biggest shareholder in SOEs7.  
7 Details about the structure of the SOEs in China in Appendix 1 
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2.1.1. SOEs and Private Enterprises 
It is agreed by researchers that China’s SOEs had poor financial performance 
compared with other forms of enterprise. For example, Jefferson et al. (2000) 
find that the productivity of private and collective enterprises were significantly 
higher than the enterprises in other ownership forms, after examining the 
productivity of enterprises in all major ownership forms including the private 
foreign-linked, State and collective enterprises during the period 1980-1996. The 
empirical results of Sachs and Woo (1997) display similar findings about the 
productivity of SOEs.  
 
Plane (1997) has highlighted that private enterprises are more efficient in 
maximising profits than public firms. Private firms have a heightened ability to 
maximise profits. Plane (1992) posits that subsidies and tax alleviation for 
inefficient public corporations might lead to a heavy financial burden for the 
government. Privatisation is necessary under these circumstances. 
 
Lardy (1998) conjectures that China’s economic reform is not successful in the 
sector controlled by SOEs. Moreover, Yusuf et al. (2006) and Jefferson and Su 
(2006) suggest that the SOEs in China should consider being privatised because 
of poor performance, as privatization of SOEs could lead to improvements. 
However, if circulation taxes and capital intensity are presumed to be at the same 
 11 
level, the industrial SOEs may have better profitability than non-state enterprises 
(Holz, 2002, 2003) 
 
Private enterprises are not more effective than public firms when the market is a 
perfect competition market, information asymmetries do not exist and contracts 
are successfully completed (Shapiro and Willing, 1990). However, in the real 
market, incentive problem result from asymmetric information and incomplete 
contracting. Thus, public corporations suffer inefficiency problem. (Sachs et al., 
2000) 
 
Agency problem is a cause of advances of private enterprises. In private 
enterprises, managers can be effectively monitored since private enterprises are 
in the market to set prices and fear bankruptcy (Vickers and Yarrow, 1990). On 
the other hand the goal of private firms is profit maximisation, but public 
corporations, in some instances, have to consider policy burdens (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1996).  Especially during planned economy in China, the government 
decided the allocation of inputs and production of outputs. Managers in SOEs did 
need to have talent to manage works, care for the productions and sales. Under 
these conditions, it was hard to distinguish effective managers from ineffective 
managers. (Lin et al., 1998) 
 12 
2.1.2 Externality effects of SOEs 
Low efficiency of SOEs does not mean the impacts of SOEs are negative on 
economic growth. Research on effects of SOEs on economic growth should 
consider direct effects and indirect effects (externality effects of SOEs). 
 
Ram (1986) creates a two-sector model (government sector and private sector) 
to describe the externality effects of government size on economic performance 
and growth. In his two-sector model, the government-produced public goods 
input into private sectors. The data of 115 developing countries suggests that 
externality effects of government were positive. 
 
Plane (1992) disagrees with Ram’s (1986) theory. He critiques that Ram inverts 
the causality relation. Government size becomes large with the growth of 
economy. Therefore, the economic growth causes the expansion of government 
size. In the empirical analysis of Ram (1986), government consumption 
expenditures are employed as the proxy indicators for output of public goods 
considered the demand effects of public goods rather than supply effects. 
Furthermore, Plane (1992) uses the data of 45 developing countries to examine 
the external effects of SOEs on economic growth, producing a negative result. 
 
Jefferson (1998) proffers that the externality effects of SOEs on China’s economic 
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growth are negative. He views SOEs as a form of impure public goods, which 
means nonexcludability and nondiminishability are two characteristics of SOEs. 
Additionally these two characteristics are the causes of externalities that give rise 
to low efficiency of SOEs in financial performance. As public goods, SOEs are over 
consumed by the society (workers, managers and public officials). With soft 
budget constraints, fiscal and/or financial subsidies are used to replenish the 
loss of economic efficiency caused by overconsumption, with inflation resulting. 
Furthermore, investment and employment in non-state sectors will be negatively 
affected by budget constraints and financial policies avoiding externalities of 
inflation. Therefore, externalities of SOEs are negative.  
 
However, the study of Jalilian and Weiss (1997) does not support the negative 
effects of SOEs on economic growth. However, their research only considers the 
direct relation between SOEs and growth, and does not considered the indirect 
effects. Doamekpor (1998) similarly does not consider the externality effects of 
SOEs. However, he uses an alternative methodology named ‘residual analysis 
method’. His analysis shows that in developed countries the externality effects of 
SOEs are negative, but in developing countries are positive. 
 
The main reason why SOEs in China occupy disadvantaged positions among the 
enterprises in other ownership forms are policy-determined burdens: distorted 
output prices, high capital intensity and heavy social burdens (Lin et al., 1998, 
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2003). In other words, SOEs have positive social externalities. Lin et al. (1998) 
suggest that in order to make SOEs more effective, policy burdens should be 
removed. However, his suggestion omits the SOEs’ positive social externality 
effects (especially, linkage effects and social welfare) on economic growth.  
 
Hirschman (1958) argues that SOEs have linkage effects on private enterprises. 
There are two kinds of linkage effects. One is the ‘backward linkages’: Supply 
bottlenecks resulting from concentrating investments in key industries by the 
government create profit opportunities for private enterprises in upstream 
industries. The other is ‘forward linkages’: The outputs of a certain industry may 
go to downstream industries rather than the final demand, which also creates 
opportunities for private enterprises. 
 
Based on Hirschman’s linkage effect theory, Holz (2011) attempts to discover 
whether China’s SOEs in high-linkage sectors play an important role in fast 
economic growth. His research shows that the linkage effects of SOEs have a 
significantly positive impact on economic growth. The retention or expansion of 
SOEs should be profit-creating rather than profit-seeking. However, the 
government, in terms of province level, does not recognise the positive linkage 




Bai et al. (2000, 2006) propose a multifaceted theory of SOEs. They state that 
when there is no high quality independent social security system, SOEs have 
incentives for production and maintaining social stability, while non-SOEs only 
have strong incentives for production. Consequently, non-SOEs benefit from the 
responsibility of SOEs for social stability, which provides a positive 
macroeconomic environment. Noticeably, Bai et al. (2000) believe that there are 
divergent interests between China’s central and local government in SOEs; 
China’s central government has enhanced incentives to maintain social stability 
compared to local governments.  
 
Since SOEs have to bear the cost of maintaining social stability, Lo (1999) 
believes that the performance of China’s industrial SOEs is underestimated, 
especially large and medium-scale enterprises following the reappraisal of the 
performance of China’s state-owned industrial enterprises from 1980-1996. 
Large and medium-size enterprises play an important role in generating 
economy.  
 
The literature on privatisation and externality effects of SOEs demonstrates that 
ownership of enterprises has non-negligible influences of ownership on China’s 
economic growth. However, this literature proves the influence by empirical 
analysis or logic theory. Fewer theoretical models are provided to describe 




Song et al. (2011) supposed that SOEs and PEs both invest in the labour-intensive 
sector, SOEs only invest in capital-intensive because the productivity of SOEs is 
lower than PEs; SOEs are crowded out of the labour-intensive industry. All 
workers are employed by PEs. Entrepreneurs continue to invest their savings in 
the labour-intensive sector. However, because of the decrease in the marginal 
product of labour, entrepreneurs will gradually stop investing in the 
labour-intensive sector and decide to invest in capital-intensive industry. If the 
marginal return of capital in capital-intensive industry is larger than 
labour-intensive industry, PEs will invest in capital-intensive industry and SOEs 
will be crowed out of capital-intensive industry. Otherwise, if PEs only invest in 
labour-intensive industry, eventually the marginal capital decreases.  
 
Overall, this section reviews China’s economic reform in 1980s. Following 
economic reform, SOEs and PEs are both active in the market and their effects 
are emphasised. Even though SOEs are less efficient than PEs, SOEs’ external 
effects on society should not be ignored.  
 
2.2 Strategy of Technology Improvements in China 
Following economic reform, China achieved remarkable economic growth based 
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on its advantages in population and lower labour cost. In the past 30 years, China 
optimised these advantages and created policies to attract foreign investors, 
along with learning advanced technology for economic growth. However, China 
now gradually transforms into an aged society and the advantage in lower labour 
cost simultaneously disappears. China is currently under pressure to change its 
economic structure.  
 
China claims its economy now enters into ‘new normal’. President Xi Jinping in 
APEC 2014 explained what ‘new normal’ means. One of the important 
characteristics of ‘new normal’ is to change China’s economy from production 
factor driven and investment driven, to innovation driven.  
 
Without considering the cost of imitation, the models of Romer (1986, 1990) 
indicate that developing countries could catch up to developed countries by 
technology imitation over a sustained period. Lin (2012) similarly believes 
imitating advanced technology from developed countries is a better way for less 
developed countries. However, empirical results (Barro, 1991; Williamson, 1991) 
do not support Romer’s (1986, 1990) claims.  
 
Apart from learning advanced technology from developed countries, domestic 
innovation is also necessary for developing countries and is compatible with 
learning foreign technology (Fu et al., 2011). This opinion is supported by 
 18 
empirical findings (Hu et al., 2005) stating that the return of firms in China is 
positively influenced by domestic innovation, while technology spill over is also 
affected by domestic capability of research and development (R&D).  
 
Prior to economic reform, China’s government centralised control and over 
protected the innovation system (Cai and Tylecote, 2008). Post reform, an open 
policy is also applied to the innovation system. Science and technology 
outsourcing activities are significantly active, as is foreign multinational 
corporations’ involvement (Liu and White, 2001). 
 
It should be noted that governments and enterprises have different intentions for 
innovation. Compared with enterprises, governments care more about the long 
term impacts of science and technology, and make long term plans for domestic 
innovation. These plans affect the R&D activities of firms in the market positively. 
(Chang et al., 2006) In addition, government will encourage firms’ R&D activities 
by providing sources required (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Haggard, 1994). 
 
SOEs that are more easily affected by government because of their ownership, 
compared with private enterprises, a majority of SOEs prefer to undertake R&D 
activities rather than imitating advanced technology. Business groups in China, 
which are mainly conducted by SOEs can significantly enhance technology and 
encourage R&D activities (Choi et al., 2011). Differences between SOEs and 
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private enterprises in strategies of technological improvements are described in 
empirical study (Guan et al.). This states how objectives for innovation by SOEs 
and non-SOEs are significantly different in terms of the importance of 
‘introducing niche products of technology’; ‘improving existing technology' to 
reduce reliance on imported equipment/technology and ‘reducing energy 
consumption’ when compared with private enterprises. 
 
In summary, there is a transition of strategy regarding technological 
improvement, from imitating advanced technology from developed countries to 
undertaking domestic R&D activities. Due to ownership, SOEs and private 
enterprises have divergent preferences for strategies focusing on technological 






Chapter 3 Literature Review 
3.1 Endogenous Imitation 
According to Schumpeterian theory, both imitation and innovation will lead to 
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technology improvements.  
 
Helpman (1993) consider imitation to be exogenous, and stronger intellectual 
property right (IPR) protection will lead to decline in imitation rate. And 
strengthening IPR protection in Northern countries has negative impacts on 
growth rates of Southern countries.  
 
With exogenous imitation, Lai (1998) thinks that if the production is transferred 
from North to South by FDI, a policy of strengthening IPR protection will lead to 
increase of innovation rate. However, with endogenous imitation, Mondal and 
Gupta (2008) have an opposite finding to Lai (1998).  
 
Glass and Wu (2007) also constructed an exogenous imitation model. In their 
model, Northern firm could engage in innovation and production transfer 
happens from Northern countries to Southern countries by FDI. And Southern 
firm will imitate products of foreign affiliates of Northern firms. Stronger IPR 
protection will reduce imitation rate, and then decrease FDI and innovation that 
could improve quality of products. Therefore, Northern firms prefer to undertake 
innovation for new products rather than quality improvements. 
 
Southern firms are usually are considered to be imitator, however, in the model of 
Glass and Saggi (2002) where imitation is endogenous, Southern firms could also 
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be innovator not only imitator under extremely special situation. Southern firms 
will innovate if it is impossible for Southern firms to imitate products 
immediately. Northern firms are also exposed to imitation if further innovation is 
prohibitive costly. Southern firms could imitate products of Northern firms and 
multinationals in South. But only innovation could improve quality level. 
Northern firms are separated into quality leader and follower. And imitation of 
Southern firms is the motivation of Northern quality leader to undertake further 
innovation. In their model, stronger IPR protection leads to higher cost of 
imitation, and rate of imitating multinational firms decreases, but relative rate of 
imitating multinational firms to imitating Northern firms increases, And FDI and 
innovation are both reduced.  
 
In the endogenous imitation model of Parello (2008), only Northern firms are 
thought as innovator again. In the model, developing and developed countries are 
both engaged in R&D, but only R&D firms in developed countries could raise 
productivity level, while R&D firms in South can acquire knowledge from abroad, 
and then absorb these knowledge and implement them. They found that IPR 
protection has negative impacts on imitation rate long term and is ineffective to 
absorb technology knowledge if technology level in South is low.  
 
Dinopoulos and Segerastrom (2010) also consider Southern firms as imitators. 
However, they divided the global economy into three categories: Northern 
 22 
quality leader, foreign affiliates of Northern quality leader in South and Southern 
firms. Any industry could switch randomly across these three categories. 
Technology transfer happens if foreign affiliates of quality leader could 
successfully hire Southern workers to engage in adaptive R&D. Southern workers 
could be hired by multinational firms to engage in adaptive R&D or by Southern 
firms to engage in imitating. This model shows stronger IPR protection has 
permanent positive effects on technology transfer and temporary positive 
influences on innovation rate of Northern quality leader. 
 
Chu et al. (2014) consider Southern firms as innovators and imitators. And there 
are two kinds of imitators, (1) effective imitators who were domestic innovation 
in South and could adapt to more advanced technology, and (2) ineffective 
imitator who are able to imitating existing technology. Effective imitators and 
foreign affiliates of Northern firms are competitive for monopolistic position in 
intermediate sector. Ineffective imitator only can steal market share from foreign 
affiliates. Chu et al. (2014) think that growth of developing countries is driven by 
innovation, FDI and imitation. And monopolistic position in intermediate sector 
could be occupied by a domestic innovator, a domestic effective imitator or a 
foreign affiliate. In developing countries, the optimal IPR protection is stage 
dependent. At the early stage of development, it is more effective to imitate 
advanced foreign technology by implementing weaker IPR protection. However, 
at later stage, government should strengthen IPR protection to encourage 
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domestic innovation.  
 
3.2 Schumpeterian distance-to-frontier models 
According to Howitt (2000), divergence of growth in the world is not only caused 
by physical capital accumulation but also caused by technology gap. Based on 
Howitt (2000), Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) modified the model, and they 
think Northern firms undertake ‘modern R&D’ while Southern firms ‘implement’ 
new technology. Firms with ‘modern R&D’ have a higher technology level. It is 
concluded that ‘modern R&D’ is the main cause of divergence of growths.  
 
Acemoglu et al. (2003) assume that managers of firms have to be in concurrently 
charge of innovation and production, which create managerial overload. To 
alleviate managerial overload, managers will outsource production activities. If 
firms are closer to technology frontier, mangers will more prefer innovation and 
outsourcing of production.  
 
Acemoglu et al. (2006) extends the model of Acemoglu et al. (2003), they divided 
manager into high-skill and low-skill. And both these two type managers involve 
in innovation and adoption of existing technologies from technology frontier. 
Managers with high skill will be continually hired if they succeed in innovation. 
And high-skill managers will replace managers who are reveled to be low skill. 
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Skills of manager are more important for innovation than imitation or adoption. 
Because of financial friction, insider managers could do better investment. 
Therefore, dismissing low-skill managers may cause loss in investment return 
but success of innovation activities. The selection of high-skill managers and 
firms is more important if countries are closer to technology frontier and pursue 
innovation-strategy. However, at the earlier stage of development, countries will 
pursue investment-strategy policy that affects economy negative in long term. 
Under this situation, countries will trap in investment-strategy and can not 
reduce the distance to technology frontier.  
 
Not as Acemoglu et al (2003, 2006) those address the importance of managers in 
distance to technology frontier, Aghion et al (2005) focus on the impacts of 
financial development. Financial development determined whether a country 
could converge the growth rate of technology frontier. If financial development of 
countries could be up to some a certain level, these countries could catch up 
technology frontier while rest of countries will still more slowly grow in long 
term. 
 
Except the factor mentioned above, which could directly or indirectly affect 
innovation activities, openness (Gersbach and Schneider, 2013), human capital 
(Romer, 1990) and IPR protection (Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa, 2008) are also 




3.3 Endogenous step size 
According to Romer (1990), production of new knowledge or technology is 
determined by research labour input and accumulated technology level, and 
therefore the step size is only affected by research labour input. And there is 
scale effect in this model that increase in research labour input will cause greater 
step size and higher the growth rate of economy. However this is not proved by 
empirical study of Jones (1995) that there were no scale effects in OECD 
countries after the Second World War. And Solow (1994) and Temple (2003) 
think the model does not correspond to reality without thinking of impacts of 
accumulated technology level on step size.  
 
Jones (1995), Kortum (1997) and Segerstrom (1998) constructed models to 
solve problems mentioned. New technology production is still determined by 
research labour and accumulated technology level, but the power of accumulated 
technology level in the function of new technology production is no more 
assumed to be 1. If the power is lower than 0, fishing out effect exists which 
means it is more difficult to obtain more advanced technology. If the power is 
over than 0, externality of new knowledge production will positively influence 
economy. However, in the model the power of accumulated technology level is 
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supposed to be smaller than 1, which is proved to be reasonable by Jones (1995). 
Under this condition, step size is positively affected by research labour input but 
negatively influenced by accumulated technology level, which means it is more 
difficult to get higher step size if current accumulated technology level is greater.  
 
Research labour input is replaced by R&D expenditure in the new knowledge 
production models of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Jones and Willams 
(2000). Cheung and Lin (2004) consider R&D expenditures as capital input in the 
production of new technology.  
 
In the empirical study of Yan et al. (2010), new knowledge production is 
determined by research larbour input, capital input and accumulated technology 
level. Yan et al. (2010) use province level data from 1998 to 2007 to estimate new 
knowledge production in China. In their estimation model, they also consider 
impacts of FDI, importing production facilities from abroad, accumulated 
technology level in other provinces. Their empirical results show that power of 
accumulated level is strictly smaller than 1. ‘Raising the bar effects’ in provinces 
are more significant than ‘spillover effects’. In terms of FDI, which is similar with 
Porter and Stern (2000). In terms of FDI, ‘spillover effects’ on knowledge 
production in China are more significant than ‘crowding out effects’ they caused. 
Overall, empirical results of Yan et al. (2010) support the theory of Jones (1995) 
that there is no scale effect in the knowledge production and the power of 
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Chapter 4 Model of Factors Affecting China 
4.1 Introduction 
China has experienced remarkable economic growth since the implementation of 
fiscal reforms in 1978. In the last decade, China’s average annual growth rate is 
10%, and the country is now recognised as the engine of the global economy. 
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Indeed, the country’s prominence in economic terms has increased since the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997 and worldwide financial crisis in 2008. Today, 
however, economic progress has stalled. The growth rate of 7.3% in 2014 was the 
lowest in recent years; however, it was still the highest in the world. The 
country’s leaders (such as President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang) 
have publically emphasised the fact that this dip in growth is entirely normal. In 
order to maintain the country’s economic stability and development, President Xi 
Jinping identified three key areas for attention: (1) ensure reasonable higher 
economic growth (around 7%); (2) update the country’s economic structure; (3) 
change the emphasis on input and investment to innovation. After years of 
incredible growth, China has entered a new period of development. The Chinese 
economy no longer has the same characteristics as before the 1978 reforms. 
Furthermore, China has paid enormous environmental and societal costs for its 
rapid growth and development. These costs include air and soil pollution, labour 
protection issues, food security, and even the disintegration of the traditional 
Chinese family structure and ethics. In 2014, the government recognised that the 
country needed to assess its achievements, consider the costs of development 
and look to the future. As a result, China has taken steps to once again reform its 
economy8.  
 
8 In Report on the Work of the Government 2014, deepening economic reform is considered as the engine of 
development of the Chinese economy.  
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Scholars, academics and experts agree that economic reforms have been the 
catalyst of China’s development since the 1980s. It is also widely acknowledged 
that further reforms are needed to support the continued development of the 
economy in the future. To fully understand the Chinese economy, it is necessary 
to review the reforms that took place in 1979. 
 
Before 1979, China adopted a Soviet approach to the development of its economy. 
Known as a ‘planning economy’, its obvious advantage was that the government 
could mobilise resources to construct priority sectors. Indeed, the 
industrialisation of China is the result of this planning economy. In Mao’s time, 
China made a number of significant achievements, such as the first ‘five-year 
plan’. These achievements, which also included the establishment of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and large communications and transport projects, form the 
basis of China’s industrialisation. However, this Soviet-type economy does have 
many disadvantages. It is not efficient because: (1) comparative advantages are 
not paid much attention to when determining the industrial structure; (2) 
managers cannot motivate workers to improve their productivity (Lin et al., 
2003). Furthermore, many eminent researchers, including Li (1984), suggested 
that China suffered heavy losses during The Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), domestic political 
pressure and international competition eventually brought about economic 
reform. After The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the government was 
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under significant pressure to change its economic policy and structure to 
improve China’s development. Under these circumstances, China amended its 
approach and established an opening-up policy. It is important to point out, 
however, that China’s reform differed from the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union.  
 
Liu (2010) suggests that China’s economic reform took place in three phases. In 
the first period (1980s), a number of small businesses were allowed to open. In 
the second phase (finished by 1993), prices were determined by supply and 
demand. This period is called ‘price marketisation’. The third phase (since the 
mid-1990s), saw the reform of state-owned enterprises. In 1997 9 , the 
government developed its ‘grasping the large and letting go of the small’ policy. 
This saw large-sized state-owned enterprises 10  (SOEs) dominating market 
power in important industries such as railways, telecommunications, electricity, 
military and mineral industries11. At the same time, small-sized state-owned 
enterprises were privatised in various forms. 
 
Sachs and Woo (1997) have summarised China’s sudden economic growth after 
9 In the 15th National Congress of Chinese Communist Party, ‘grasping the large and letting go of the small’ 
policy was formulated. 
10 According to the definition of SOE in China, there are three types of SOEs. The first one is the state-owned 
individual proprietorship enterprises where the state owns 100% shares of enterprises. The second are 
state-holding enterprises where the state owns more than 50% or less than 50% of shares, but has more 
shares than other shareholders. The last is a state-joining enterprise where the state holds less than 50% 
shares and fewer shares than other shareholders. Most researchers refer to SOEs as the first of two types.  
11 China Enterprise Confederation/China Enterprise Directors Association publishes the ‘China Top 500 
enterprises’ list every year. According to the ‘China Top 500 enterprises in 2011’, there are 316 SOEs in the 
top 500. The ratio of SOEs is more than 60%, and all of the top 10 enterprises are SOEs. 
 31 
                                                        
economic reform in 1978. They point out that the experimentalist school 
attribute the country’s growth to market reform that changed China to a ‘socialist 
market economy with Chinese characteristics’ from a planning economy; 
however, the convergence school considers a convergence with a non-social 
market economy, which changed the country’s economic structure and utilised 
the comparative advantages of China’s position in East Asia.  
 
The most significant change after 1978 was China’s transformation from a 
planning economy to a market economy. This helped to open up the country’s 
domestic market to the world and attract foreign investment. Privatisation of 
SOEs is also an important aspect of the reform. Xu (2011) attributed the 
remarkable economic growth in China to fundamental institutional restructuring, 
which featured three core concepts: privatisation; political decentralisation and 
regional centralisation; and competition. In fact, today, private enterprises (PEs) 
in China are considered to have contributed the most towards China’s 
unprecedented economic growth (Allen et al., 2005; Huang, 2008).  
 
However, SOEs should be considered in any assessment of the Chinese economy. 
Indeed, the creation of SOEs is an indirect tool for governments to manage the 
economy, especially in strategic industries. Since the reform of SOEs in 1995, the 
government no longer directly controls and manages SOEs; instead, it is the 
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biggest shareholder in these types of companies12. Large-sized Chinese SOEs 
have dominant influences on domestic markets, and the role of Chinese SOEs on 
international markets is also increasing (Elliot and Zhou, 2013; Hsueh, 2011). In 
2013, the government owned 77 domestic firms out of a total of 85 listed on the 
Fortune 500. It should be noted that, in a number of stylised, non-strategic 
sectors, such as textiles, papermaking and catering, Chinese SOEs are still active 
after privatisation reform (Du and Liu, 2012). 
 
Whilst it is generally accepted that private firms are more productive and 
profitable, (Jefferson et al., 2000; Sachs and Woo, 1997; Plane, 1992, 1997; Su, 
2006), questions about the externality effects of SOEs remain (Ram 1986). 
Indeed, there is an on-going debate about whether the externality effects of SOEs 
are positive. Empirical results produced in Plane’s 1992 study show that 
externality effects are negative. Similarly, Jefferson (1998) argued that, in China, 
externality effects of SOEs negatively affected economic growth. Jalilian and 
Weiss (1997) hold opposite views. Furthermore, Doamekpor’s analysis (1998) 
shows that externality effects are positive in developing countries. In addition, 
SOEs have to take strong social responsibility (Bai et al., 2000, 2006) and suffer 
heavy social burdens (Lin et al, 1998, 2003). Positive linkage effects between 
SOEs and private enterprises (Hirschman, 1958; Holz, 2011) also influence 
economic growth.  
12 Details about the structure of the SOEs in China can be found in Appendix 4.1 
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In summary, PEs and SOEs have made a considerable contribution to China’s 
economic growth. It is therefore necessary to consider the wider impacts of SOEs 
and PEs in order to fully analyse China’s economy. After the financial crisis of 
2008, a phenomenon termed ‘Guo Jin Min Tui’ (the state advances, the private 
sector retreats) arose. One cause of this phenomenon was financial friction 
towards PEs. There is discrimination against PEs in the Chinese banking sector 
(Brandt and Li, 2003; Cull and Xu, 2003), as SOEs benefit from advantages in the 
lending market and are placed under fewer controls by the government. In 
Report on the Work of the Government 2015, Premier Li Keqiang said that the 
government should support small and medium-sized firms and reduce the 
difficulties they face in the lending market. The majority of small and 
medium-sized businesses in China are PEs. However, large-sized private 
enterprises (LPEs), such as Alibaba, Huawei, Baidu and Shagang Group, are more 
competitive than SOEs. Banks are also receptive to LPEs in the lending market 
(Firth et al., 2009). Therefore, in any analysis of PEs, the size of the organisation 
should be considered.   
 
Overall, PEs and SOEs are two important parts that make up China’s economy. 
The ownership of firms should not neglect to analyze China’s growth. The novelty 
of this chapter is that firms in China are divided into three types (SOEs, LPEs, and 
SMEs) based on reality in China. Previous studies about China are only focus on 
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ownership of firms or size effect separately. Less of research considered 
ownership and size effect together in the model. However, with the development 
of PEs in China, important characteristics of LPEs and SMEs, which will affect the 
growth of outputs are significant different with each other, for example the 
interest rate in the lending market and research capabilities. Therefore, this 
chapter considers both impacts of the ownership and size effect on the outputs.  
 
In addition, as the explanations in Chapter 1, base on Schumpeterian Model, this 
chapter only focuses on how technology improvements will affect the growth of 
these three types of firms in China.  
 
The research questions are followings in this chapter: 
(1) Which factors and how these factor will affect technology improvements of 
SOEs, LPEs and SMEs, and thus affect their growth? 
(2) Which type of firms will grow most, and under which kinds of situation? 
(3) How the contribution of these three types of firms to total gross productivity 
will change? 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines statistics 
about SOEs, LPEs and SMEs with reference to employment, speed of expansion 
and financing costs. In the second part, the study focuses on growth models of 
the three types of organisation, which have been developed based on the 
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Schumpeterian framework, Ex Ante Screening model and Ex Post Monitoring, 
and Moral Hazard model. In this part, determinants influencing growth rates and 
their relationships are discussed. Finally, the third section explores each type of 
businesses’ production volumes.  
 
4.2 Stylised facts 
4.2.1 Employment 
The proportion of the urban population employed by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) was 35% in 2000, but this decreased significantly to 16.6% in 2013. The 
urban employment share of foreign enterprise (FEs) was lower than 4% during 
the same period, and its increase was gradual. In 2013, the number of people 
employed by FEs was still the lowest at around 8%. The urban employment share 
of private enterprises (PEs) was slightly higher than FEs (5.5%); however, the 
sector experienced significant growth during the period between 2000 and 2013. 
Today, 21.6% of the working population are employed by PEs. PEs’ contribution 
to urban employment is growing year on year. In China, therefore, PEs and SOEs 




Figure 4.1 THE RATIO OF URBAN EMPLOYMENT BY STATUS OF REGISTRATION  
Note: The figure shows urban employment ratios in foreign enterprises (FE), private enterprises (PE) 
and state-owned enterprises (SOE) from 2000 to 2013. FEs include enterprises invested in by foreign 
countries, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao 
Source: China Statistics Database 
 
The employment rate of PEs jumped from 12.8% in 2001 to 25.6% in 2002. After 
a one-year period of stability, the rate of increase dropped from 26.1% to 16.7% 
in 2004. The decreasing trend was maintained until 2007. In the years that 
followed, employment rates remained stable, ranging from around 9% to 10%. 
The rate of employment in SOEs fluctuated from 2001 to 2012, and in 2013 the 
increase rate slumped to -6.9%, which is even lower than the rate in 2001 (-5.75). 
The increase rate of SOEs has generally been below 0, with the exception of three 
years between 2010 and 2012. Figure 4.2 shows that the increase in numbers of 




Figure 4.2 INCREASE RATES OF EMPLOYEES IN SOES AND PES FROM 2001 TO 2013 
Source: China Statistics Database 
 
Figure 4.3 shows that there is no particular trend in terms of the increase in 
numbers of SOEs, PEs, large-sized enterprises, small and medium-sized 
enterprises between 2001 and 2013. However, the growth in the number of SOEs 
is slower than the rise in PEs. There are two spikes in the number of LPEs in 
2003 and 2011. Excluding these two values, the average increase rate of SMEs 




Figure 4.3 INCREASE RATES OF NUMBERS OF SOES, PES, LARGE-SIZED ENTERPRISES AND SMALL AND 
MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 
Source: China Statistics Database 
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4.2.2 Bank lending to private enterprises 
 
Figure 4.4 SHORT-TERM LOANS TO PRIVATE ENTERPRISES AND SELF-EMPLOYED INDIVIDUALS FROM 
1999 TO 2009 
Source: China Statistical Year Book 2000-2010  
 
In the period 1999 to 2009, short loans to PEs and self-employed individuals 
jumped from 579.1 million Yuan to 5926.6 million Yuan. Similarly, the proportion 
of short-term loans to PEs and self-employed individuals increased from 0.9% to 
5%. This percentage is still, however, relatively low. Furthermore, despite 
financing support for private enterprises gradually increasing, PEs still faced a 




Figure 4.5 THE PERCENTAGE OF SHORT-TERM LOANS TO PRIVATE ENTERPRISES AND SELF-EMPLOYED 
INDIVIDUALS IN TOTAL SHORT-TERM LOANS FROM 1999 TO 2009 
Source: China Statistical Year Books 2000-2010 
 
4.2.3 Data for SOEs, LPEs and SMEs 
Standards of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs 
The official file ‘Interim Provisions on Standards for Medium and Small 
Enterprises’13 was issued on 18th June 2011. This document set the standards 
for small and medium-sized enterprises across a range of industries and sectors. 
This chapter uses these standards, which are outlined in Table 1 below. 
 
13 ‘Interim Provisions on Standards for Medium and Small Enterprises (2011), 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-07/04/content_1898747.htm 
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 Large-sized enterprises Small and medium-sized 
enterprises 
Number of Employees ≥1000 <1000 
Operating Revenue (RMB) ≥400 million Yuan <400 million Yuan 
Table 4.1 THE STANDARDS FOR LARGE-SIZED ENTERPRISES AND SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED 
ENTERPRISES 
 
The criterion for LPEs is over 1,000 employees and operating revenue of no less 
than 400 million Yuan. SMEs are categorised as employing fewer than 1,000 
people and having operating revenue less than million Yuan. 
 
Bank borrowings and interest rates for SOEs, LPEs and SMEs 
Table 4.2 shows the number of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs that are publicly issued 
firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange since 
1st January 2008. There are 636 publicly issued SOEs, 441 publicly issued LPEs 
and 424 publicly issued SMEs. None of these firms have changed their ownership 






 SOEs LPEs SMEs 
Number of Firms 441 636 424 
Table 4.2 THE NUMBER OF PUBLICLY ISSUED FIRMS OF SOES, LPES AND SMES IN CHINA FROM 1ST 
JANUARY 2008 TO 30TH MAY 2013 
Source: CSMAR Database 
 
A summary of the interest rates and bank borrowings of publicly issued SOEs, 
LPEs and SMEs is presented in Table 4.3. There are 63 SOEs and 37 LPEs with 
banking loans and interest rates information, whilst only 22 SMEs have provided 
this information. According to the interest rate information declared by these 
122 publicly issued firms, SOEs enjoyed the lowest average interest rate (about 
6.94%). SMEs have the highest average interest rate, which is approximately 
10.76%. The average interest rate paid by LPEs is 8.82%. According to Table 3, 
SMEs face the harshest financial frictions in China. 
 
 Number of Firms Average Interest Rate 
(%) 
The Amount of Loans 
(million Yuan) 
SOEs 63 6.94 31181.04 
LPEs 37 8.82 17186.80 
SMEs 22 10.76 9338.00 
Table 4.3 SUMMARY OF INTEREST RATES AND BANKING LOANS OF PUBLICLY ISSUED FIRMS OF SOES, 
LPES AND SMES IN CHINA FROM 1ST JANUARY 2008 TO 30TH MAY 2013 
Source: CSMAR Database 
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The statistics outlined in this section prove that SOEs and PEs are two important 
sectors within the Chinese economy. However, LPEs contribute the most in terms 
of employment and the expending speed of PEs is larger than SOEs. Evidence also 
shows that the number of SOEs in China is decreasing. In addition, the average 
increase rate in the total number of small and medium-sized firms is slightly 
higher than large-sized firms. Data also shows that PEs are subject to greater 
financial penalties than other types of businesses. PEs are discriminated against 
by the banking sector, particularly with regard to interest rates, which are higher 
than those paid by SOEs. However, size also determines financing cost. The 
financing cost of LPEs is lower than that of SMEs. Characteristics highlighted by 
these stylised facts are discussed further in terms of their influence on SOEs, 
LPEs, and SMEs.  
 
4.3 The model  
In China, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private enterprises (PEs) make an 
important contribution to China’s economy. However, PEs face a number of 
financial restrictions and penalties, which place them at a disadvantage to SOEs. 
The banking sector, for instance, consider size when assessing the credit of PEs. 
Whilst it is widely accepted that the majority of small and medium-sized firms 
are in fact privately owned, large-sized PEs, such as Huawei, Alibaba, Tencent, 
China Wanda Group, Shagang Group, are treated differently by the banks. In this 
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chapter, ownership of firms and the issues of size are both considered in relation 
to the growth of Chinese firms within a closed market with financial restrictions.  
 
As discussed, there are three types of businesses in China. They are state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), large-sized private enterprises (LPEs) and small and 
medium-sized private enterprises (SMEs). LPEs and SMEs have the same 
ownership structure, which differs to that of SOEs. However, SMEs are 
discriminated against by the credit market, which imposes financial restraints on 
their operations. LPEs, which also receive financial penalties, are, however, not 
impacted as much by these financial frictions. Banks in China, most of which are 
state-owned, are less interested in the ownership of firms, but more interested 
about their size, perspective and profitability. Banks are typically more willing to 
provide loans to enterprises with good credit and valuable projects. 
 
The total production in the market is, 
                                                         𝑌𝑌 = 𝑦𝑦𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 + 𝑦𝑦𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆                                                  (4.1)    
𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝐿  and 𝑀𝑀  represent SOEs, LPEs and SMEs respectively. 𝑌𝑌  is the total 
production in the market. 𝑦𝑦𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 , 𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆, 𝑦𝑦𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆  are the total production of SOEs, LPEs 
and SMEs. 
 
Schumpeterian model describes intermediate products and labour are inputs of 
production of final goods, and final goods are used for consumption and also 
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inputs of R&D and production of intermediate goods. And monopolists in an 
intermediate sectors charge the price of intermediate goods. Average 
productivity of production of final goods is accumulation of productivity across 
all intermediate sectors. In non-innovating sectors, productivity keeps same as 
last period.  
 
For each type firms, the production of final goods is  




where 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝐿,𝑀𝑀} , 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗[0,1]  presents intermediate sector 𝑗𝑗 , 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖  presents the 
average effective labour inputs per firm for each type of firm. 𝐸𝐸𝚤𝚤� = 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 
indicates employees of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs. 
 
Entrepreneurs would like to maximise their profit and the relative price of 
intermediate goods to final goods is 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆(𝑗𝑗) = 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆1−𝛼𝛼(𝑗𝑗)(𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖)1−𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝛼𝛼(𝑗𝑗) 





The optimal production for each type of firm is, 
                                                                𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆∗ = Π𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆                                                            (4.2) 
where Π𝑖𝑖＝𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝚤𝚤�  . 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  is the number of each type of firm. 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖  presents the 
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average effective labour inputs per firm for each type of firm. 𝐸𝐸𝚤𝚤� = 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 
indicates employees of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs. 𝜋𝜋𝚤𝚤� = 𝛼𝛼
2𝛼𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼  is the constants 
indicator. 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 presents the average level of productivities of each type of firm. 
Equation (4.2) shows the optimal output of each type of enterprise in relation to 
the growth in productivity 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 . It can be concluded that the growth of each type 
of firm is related to the growth in productivity, which is determined by 
innovation.  
 
There is 𝜇𝜇 opportunity for innovation, which leads to 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 = 𝛾𝛾�𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1. If there is no 
innovation, the productivity remains 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 = 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 . Therefore, the expected 
productivity at time 𝑡𝑡 is, 
𝐸𝐸(𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆) = 𝜇𝜇𝛾𝛾�𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 
By the law of large numbers, the growth rate of average productivity for each 




𝜇𝜇𝛾𝛾�𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆−1 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆−1
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆−1
− 1 = 𝜇𝜇(𝛾𝛾� − 1) 
The growth rate of employees at each type of enterprise is 
𝐸𝐸𝚤𝚤𝑆𝑆�
𝐸𝐸𝚤𝚤(𝑆𝑆−1)�
− 1 = 𝑒𝑒𝚤𝚤𝑆𝑆� − 1 
The growth rate 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 of outputs is determined by growth rates of productivity and 
employees,   






�− 1 = [𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖(𝛾𝛾𝚤𝚤� − 1) + 1]𝑒𝑒𝚤𝚤𝑆𝑆� − 1                      (4.3) 
In this chapter, 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 is the average growth rate of each type of firm. 
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As discussed in the previous section, the growth in the number of people 
employed by SOEs is lower than that of PEs. Moreover, the growth rate of the 
total number of SOEs is lowest. The average effective labour inputs of each type 
of firm in each period are constant. Only the total amount of each type of 






= 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  
The change rates in the total numbers of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs could also present 
change rates in the number of employees in each type of firm. 
 
The reform of SOEs brought with it a change in focus, from sectors such as 
labour-intensive, manual industries to high-tech, economic and political security 
industries. Merger, consolidation and regrouping between SOEs also became 
increasingly common. For example, CSR Corporation and CNR Corporation 
consolidated into CRRC Corporation in order to become more competitive in the 
international rail market. Therefore, the change rate in the total number of SOEs 
is the lowest among the three types of firms. The change rate in the number of 
LPEs is considerably less than SMEs. This is because – in a competitive market – 
achieving growth in large-sized firms is more difficult than in small and 
medium-sized firms.  
𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀 > 𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿 > 𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆 
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As the market is comprised of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs, the growth rate of the whole 
market is, 









𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚                                          (4.4) 
 
4.3.1 Research activities 
In The Economics of Growth (Aghion and Howitt, 2009), the possibility of 
innovation occurring 𝜇𝜇 is positively related to the amount spent on research 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 
but is negatively related to ?̌?𝐴𝑆𝑆 = 𝛾𝛾𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 which is the productivity when research 
is successful. When technological advances become more complex, the 
improvement is harder to achieve. 





                              0 < 𝜎𝜎 < 1                        (4.5) 
where 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 presents the effectiveness of innovation activities of each type of firm. 
And based on the Equation (4.5), the amount spent on research 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 is expressed 
as,  





𝜎𝜎                     0 < 𝜎𝜎 < 1                                  (4.6)  
 
4.3.2 Growth rates of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs with financial 
frictions 
In reality, research activities involve significant capital outlay. One of the notable 
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constraints that can be placed on innovative activities is financial friction. There 
are two main models that describe financial frictions for economic growth in the 
Schumpeterian framework. They are: Ex Ante Screening model and models with 
Ex Post Monitoring and Moral Hazard.  
 
Models with Ex Ante Screening 
According to King and Levine (1993), banks have to determine whether or not a 
given project/research is feasible before lending money. In this equation, 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 is 
the screening cost and 𝜃𝜃 (0 < 𝜃𝜃 < 1) is the possibility that the project is feasible. 
It is supposed that 𝑃𝑃 is the repayment that borrowers pay the banks. When the 
research project is feasible, banks will receive the repayment 𝑃𝑃. However, there 
is 1 − 𝜃𝜃 possibility that the bank will receive nothing. The expected repayment 
is  
𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃) ∗ 0 = 𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃 
The expected profit of the bank is, 
𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆  
The expected profit should be equal to or larger than 0. If 𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃 ≥ 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆, and the 
repayment of borrowers 𝑃𝑃 is,  
                                                                      𝑃𝑃 ≥
𝑓𝑓
𝜃𝜃
𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆                                                             
In reality, there is not perfect competition in the banking sector. In this situation, 
a mark-up is added to the expected profit (that is thought to be 0 in a perfectly 
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competitive banking sector), which is assumed as exogenous, 
                                                      𝑃𝑃 = �
𝑓𝑓
𝜃𝜃
+ 𝜀𝜀�𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆                                                              
where 𝜀𝜀 is an exogenous mark-up in the banking sector.  
 
The benefit from the research activity is written as, 





𝜋𝜋�?̌?𝐴𝑆𝑆 − 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 �1 +
𝑓𝑓
𝜃𝜃
+ 𝜀𝜀�      
To maximise the benefit from innovation research, the optimal research input is 
worked out as, 








1−𝜎𝜎                                     
In a non-perfect competitive banking market, based on Function (4.5), the 
possibility of technological improvement occurring is,  
                                           𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆 = �
𝜋𝜋�𝜎𝜎






1−𝜎𝜎                                                 
Therefore, in a non-perfect competitive banking market, the average production 
growth rate of each type of firm is, 





















𝑒𝑒𝚤𝚤𝑆𝑆� − 1                   (4.7) 
As 𝜀𝜀 is an exogenous mark-up in the banking sector, the average growth rate of 
each type of firm in the capital-intensive sector is negatively related to its 
financing cost parameter 𝑓𝑓/𝜃𝜃  and positively related to the effectiveness of 
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innovation activities 𝜆𝜆 and technical improvement 𝛾𝛾𝚤𝚤� .  
 
Impacts of financing costs on growth rates 
 
When taking into account financial frictions, the financing cost actually 
determines the growth rate of each type of firm if two conditions hold that: (1) 
the effectiveness of innovation activities of each type of enterprise is the same 
(𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆 = 𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿 = 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀 = 𝜆𝜆); (2) the technical improvements caused by research activities 
of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs are at the same level (𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆� = 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿� = 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀� = 𝛾𝛾�). According to 
Function (4.7), the average growth rates in production of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs 
are negatively related to their financing cost parameters 𝑓𝑓/𝜃𝜃. In addition, the 
growth in the number of employees within each type of firm is the same (𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆� =
𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿� = 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀�).  
 
In China, discrimination against private firms exists in the lending sector (Brandt 
and Li, 2003; Cull and Xu, 2003). Lending for research activities usually take the 
form of a medium to long-term loan. When undertaking a credit assessment for 
this type of loan, lenders check the background of debtors. Following the reform 
of SOEs in the 1990s, SOEs – particularly small and medium-sized enterprises – 
were eliminated from the market. In spite of this, the majority of SOEs survived, 
and play an important role in the economic and political security of China today. 
In general, however, these successful SOEs are large-sized and wield significant 
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economic power in market. In these circumstances, investment projects involving 
SOEs are more attractive to creditors as they are perceived as having a higher 
feasible probability.  
 
Information possessed by creditors in regard to loan applicants may lead to 
discrimination against certain groups of businesses (Arrow, 1998; Fafchamps, 
2000). Indeed, the assessment of loan applicants’ characteristics is based on 
whether it is costly for banks to acquire information of their creditworthiness 
(Schwab, 1986; Arrow, 1998; Darity and Mason, 1998; Yinger, 1998). In China, 
banks14 normally have a mutually beneficial relationship with SOEs, and have 
existing channels for obtaining credit information (Brandt and Li, 2003). Whilst 
state ownership and business connections with the government still carry weight 
in banks’ lending decisions in China, commercial judgements, such as an 
enterprise’s size, profitability, cooperate governance, and location are also 
important determinates (Firth et al., 2009).  
 
Overall, it is more feasible for banks to undertake research into SOEs because of 
their economic strength and political connections. Based on commercial 
judgements, LPEs are a more attractive proposition to banks than SMEs. 
 𝜃𝜃𝑆𝑆 > 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿 > 𝜃𝜃𝑀𝑀 
14 There are five important banks in China. They are: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of 
China, Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Bank of Communications. These banks were 
previously sole funded by the state. The government owned 99.45% of the ten largest banks in China (La 
Porta et al., 2002). After 2004, they were transferred to state-holding banks. More details about the banking 
sector in China can be found at http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/jrjg/index.html.     
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When considering the cost to a bank of acquiring information about a company’s 
creditworthiness, SMEs are at a disadvantage in comparison to SOEs and LPEs. 
This is because SOEs normally have a history of long-term cooperation with the 
banks, and the channel for obtaining information already exists. LPEs have a size 
advantage and cooperative governance, and the screening cost is less than with 
SMEs. Indeed, it is costly for a bank to obtain information about SMEs. 
𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆 < 𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿 < 𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀 
Broadly speaking, the financing cost of SMEs is higher than LPEs and SOEs. In 
addition, the financing cost of SOEs is the lowest. 









                                                        (4.8) 
 
In reality, interest rates could supersede the financing costs of each type of firm. 
In fact, SOEs have a large advantage when it comes to interest rates on loans15. 
Inequality (4.8) is proven by the average interest rates of SOEs, LPEs and SOEs 
showed in Table 4.3.  
 
According to Function (4.7) and Inequality (4.8), it can be concluded that the 
production growth rate of SOEs in a capital-intensive industry is highest, while 
the average growth rate of SMEs is the lowest,  
                                         𝑔𝑔𝑀𝑀 < 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿 < 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠                                  
State-owned and commercial banks will perceive a LPE with a strong credit 
15 Table 4.3 shows that SOEs have the lowest banking interest rate. 
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history and innovative, effective projects as equally attractive as a SOE. In this 
circumstance, the production growth rates of LPEs with good credit and 
promising projects may be close to or even equal to that of SOEs. 
 
Differences in the technical research capabilities of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs 
 
This section is focused exclusively on the impact of financial frictions on growth 
rates. The role of technical capabilities is not discussed; indeed,, the effectiveness 
of innovation activities and technical improvement through research differs 
between each type of enterprise. This section will therefore explore the 
differences in the technical research capabilities of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs, and 
discuss the subsequent influence on growth rates. 
 
The number of applications for patents by state-owned manufacturing 
enterprises in 2012 and 2011 averaged 2.03 and 1.44 per firm, which is 
significantly higher than applications lodged by private manufacturing 
enterprises (0.21 and 0.16 respectively). In 2011, outputs directly linked to R&D 
activities in state-owned manufacturing enterprises was about 0.16 billion Yuan 
per firm, whilst the outputs of private manufacturing enterprises was only 7.85 
million Yuan. The average ratio of outputs to inputs in terms of R&D activities 
from 2008 to 2009 in large and medium-sized private enterprises was 19.39. The 
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figure for large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises was 17.22.16 On this 
basis, it is safe to assume that innovation activities in SMEs are the least effective 
and LPEs are most effective (𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀 < 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆 < 𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿).  
 
The average value of production per new product development project of large 
and medium-sized SOEs from 2008 to 2010 was 33.99 million Yuan, whilst the 
average value of LPEs was 35.52 million Yuan. In 2011, the figure for state-owned 
enterprises was 42.56 million Yuan; in contrast, privately owned enterprises 
average value was less than 21 million Yuan. It can be concluded that technical 
improvements (or an increase in productivity) as a result of research activities 
conducted by SOEs is less than LPEs; however, the gap is not especially large. 
Technical improvements made by SMEs are the smallest (𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀 < 𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆 < 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿).17 
It is supposed that Ωi = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖
1
1−𝜎𝜎(𝛾𝛾𝚤𝚤� − 1) . Ωi presents the technical research 










presents the joint effects of the financing cost and technical research capabilities 
of each type of firm. As a result, Function (4.7) can be transformed into,  
                      𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 = Τ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 − 1                              
According to the statistics, the technical research capabilities of SMEs are the 
lowest, whilst LPEs are the highest. The technical research capabilities of SOEs 
16 Data sourced from the China Statistics Database 
17 Data sourced from the China Statistics Database 
 56 
                                                        
are lower than LPEs, but the difference is not significant.  
Ω𝐿𝐿 > Ω𝑆𝑆 > Ω𝑀𝑀 
Based on Function (8), the technical research capability of each type of firm (Ω𝑖𝑖) 
positively affects growth rates. However, financing costs are negatively related to 
growth rates. 
 
The technical capabilities of SMEs are the lowest, but their financing costs are 
highest. It can be concluded that the combined impact of financing cost and 
research capability on SMEs is the least significant. The technical capabilities of 
SOEs are lower than LPEs, and financing costs of SOEs lower than LPEs. The 
combined impact of financing cost and research capabilities of SOEs and LPEs 
can be determined by SOEs’ advantages in financing costs and LPEs’ advantages 
in technical research capabilities. If the advantages of LPEs in technical research 











], the combined effects of financing cost and research capabilities are 
less than SOEs (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 > 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿). However, if the advantages of SOEs in financing cost 











], the combined impact of financing cost and research capabilities of 
SOEs is smaller than LPEs (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 < 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿).  
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, the average growth rate of SOEs is higher than 
LPEs. If the strengths of SOEs in terms of financing cost prevail over their 
weaknesses in technical research capability, the combined impact of research 
capabilities and financing costs on SOEs is more significant than the effect on 
LPEs. Moreover, if SOEs’ strengths outweigh disadvantages in the growth rates in 






, the average growth rate of SOEs is larger than SMEs. On the basis that 
SMEs have the lowest combined results in terms of technical research 
capabilities and financing costs, and the advantages of SOEs in joint effects are 
more significant than the inferiorities in SOEs’ total labour inputs, SOEs will – on 
average – grow more rapidly than SMEs. Similarly, the average growth rate of 







Proposition 4.1: In the Ex Ante Screening model, average growth rates of 
SOEs, LPEs and SMEs are determined by their technical research 
capabilities, financing costs and the growth rate in the total number of each 
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type of firm. The order of growth rates is determined by whether their 
superiorities in certain determinants outweigh their weaknesses in other 
determinants.  
 
Models with Ex Post Monitoring and Moral Hazard 
Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999) suppose that banks make the decision to 
lend money, but borrowers make the choice to default. ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 (0 < ℎ < 1) is the 
default cost of to the borrower. ℎ indicates the financing development and the 
ability of banks to monitor borrowers. When financing development is high and 
the ability of banks to monitor the borrowers is great, ℎ is higher. This means 
that the default costs faced by borrowers is higher and there is less possibility 
that they will choose to default on their loans. 
 
It is supposed that Γ is the interest factor and 𝜇𝜇 is the possibility of innovation 
occurring. The expected repayment is 𝜇𝜇Γ𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆. When the expected repayment is 
larger than the default cost, borrowers choose to default， 
                                                                  𝜇𝜇Γ𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 > ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆                                                          
Banks will lend money to borrowers only when the expected repayment equals 
the total amount of the loan (there is no time cost, and so there is no discounted 
factor), 
𝜇𝜇Γ𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 = 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆   
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(𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 − 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆) = 𝜈𝜈(𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 − 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆) = 𝑅𝑅�𝑆𝑆                             (4.9) 
where the credit multiplier 𝜈𝜈 = 1/(1 − ℎ) and 𝜈𝜈 > 1. 
 
It is supposed that Λ𝑆𝑆 = 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 − 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 , and Λ𝑆𝑆  is the amount of funds spent on 
research projects. Whenever Inequality (4.9) holds, the borrowers choose to 
default. The equilibrium growth rate is obtained by substituting the constrained 
investment 𝑅𝑅�𝑆𝑆 = 𝜈𝜈Λ𝑆𝑆 into the innovation production Function (4.6). Thereby the 
growth rate of production is 





+ 1�  𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 − 1 
?̌?𝐴𝑆𝑆  is target productivity/technology level, and the technology level in the last 
period is ?̌?𝐴𝑆𝑆 = ?̅?𝛾?̌?𝐴𝑆𝑆−1. The productivity level in the first period is assumed to be 
?̌?𝐴1 = ?̅?𝛾（𝐴𝐴0 + 𝜍𝜍) . ?̅?𝛾  is the geometric average value of technological 
improvements throughout the entire period. 𝐴𝐴0 is the initial productivity that 
occurs as a result of the technical improvements and is assumed to be the same 
for each type of firm. Initial productivity 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 can be understood as the average 
productivity level of industries entered into by enterprises during an initial 
period. It is therefore supposed that 𝐴𝐴0 = 1. 𝜍𝜍 is the productivity achieved by 
effective management. The function ?̌?𝐴𝑆𝑆 of ?̅?𝛾 is,  
?̌?𝐴𝑆𝑆 = ?̅?𝛾𝑆𝑆(1 + 𝜍𝜍 )  
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where ?̅?𝛾𝑆𝑆 presents an accumulated technical improvements during the entire 
period. 
 
The average growth in production rates of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs are presented as 
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 = �Ω𝑖𝑖 �
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖Λi
Φ𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝜍𝜍𝑖𝑖  )
�
𝜎𝜎
+ 1� 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 − 1                                (4.10)   
where Φi = ?̅?𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 is an accumulated technical improvements of each type of firm. 
 





+ 1, which indicates the combined effect of 
technical impacts, default costs, and management effectiveness.  
 
In this chapter, only a formal channel of financing is referred to; that is, debtors 
borrow funds from banks in order to conduct research. In this model, Λ 
represents only the firms themselves. 
 
On the basis of Function (4.10), it can be concluded that: (1) average growth 
rates of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs are positively related to their technical research 
capabilities, default costs, funds assigned to research activities and the growth 
rates of the number of each type of enterprise; (2) the accumulated technical 




In the model, ℎ is the default cost, and presents the effectiveness of the banks 
monitoring the firms. The effectiveness of monitoring SOEs, LPEs and SMEs is 
determined by whether it is costly for banks to obtain accurate information 
about each type of firms’ investment projects and creditworthiness.  
 
As a result of established channels and practices between banks and SOEs 
(Brandt and Li, 2003), SOE monitoring is the most effective (ℎ𝑠𝑠). LPEs have a 
larger ℎ because banks can obtain more detailed information about the projects 
and firms, and owners of LPEs can less easily escape any ramifications should 
they choose to default. If the owners of LPEs do choose to default and seek to 
escape punishment, however, banks are able to acquire fixed and other assets to 
decrease the losses caused by default. If a LPE chooses to default, therefore, 
banks can effectively punish them. However, financial information about SMEs 
and their projects is less easy to obtain and evaluate (as a result, SMEs typically 
have lower credit). Owners of SMEs can more easily evade punishment if they 
choose to default. Furthermore, even if the owner(s) of a SME are caught, they 
can, for example, transfer money or assets to family members or other relations. 
Banks therefore find it difficult to acquire assets to cover their losses. 
Consequently, the default cost ℎ of LPEs is larger than SMEs. Overall, banks are 
most effective in their monitoring of SOEs, whilst SMEs have the lowest default 
cost (ℎ𝑠𝑠 > ℎ𝑙𝑙 > ℎ𝑚𝑚). This means the credit multiplier of SOEs is the largest and 
SMEs the smallest. 
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 𝜈𝜈𝑆𝑆 > 𝜈𝜈𝐿𝐿 > 𝜈𝜈𝑀𝑀 
The average per-firm cost of state-owned manufacturing enterprises’ R&D input 
in 2011 and 2012 is approximately 11.63 million Yuan. In contrast, the outlay of 
private manufacturing enterprises is only 0.51 million Yuan. Considering the size 
effects of PEs, small and medium-sized private manufacturing enterprises’ R&D 
inputs are presumed to be less than large-sized private manufacturing 
enterprises. 
𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 > 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 
On this basis, it is assumed that SOEs spend the most on R&D activities, which is 
presented as Λ𝑆𝑆. The outlay of SMEs is the lowest.  
Λ𝑆𝑆 ≥ Λ𝐿𝐿 ≥ Λ𝑀𝑀 
Ignoring the external effects determiner (Lin et al., 1998, 2003; Bai et al., 2000, 
2006; Holz, 2011), SOEs in China are less effective than PEs in terms of financing 
performance (Jefferson et al., 2000; Lardy, 1998; Plane, 1997; Sachs and Woo, 
1997). For example, managers in PEs can be effectively monitored since PEs seek 
profit maximisation and are open to financial takeovers (Vickers and Yarrow, 
1990). By contrast, SOEs have policy burdens and tend to be less effectively 
managed (Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). Therefore, the effective management 
indicator of SOEs (𝜍𝜍𝑆𝑆) is smallest, and LPEs are the most effective in terms of 
management.  
𝜍𝜍𝐿𝐿 >  𝜍𝜍𝑀𝑀 >  𝜍𝜍𝑆𝑆 
The accumulated technical improvements of LPEs (Φ𝐿𝐿) are highest. SMEs are 
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weakest at accumulated technical improvements (Φ𝑀𝑀) because of the technical 
research capabilities of this type of firm. The average number of patent 
applications by state-owned manufacturing enterprises in 2012 and 2011 is 2.03 
and 1.44 respectively. The number of applications by private manufacturing 
enterprises is 0.21 and 0.16. Therefore, the accumulated technical improvements 
of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs is presented as, 
Φ𝐿𝐿 > Φ𝑆𝑆 > Φ𝑀𝑀 
In summary, SOEs have a distinct advantage due to the amount of research 
activities they invest in. However, the default costs of SOEs are the highest. SOEs 
perform better than SMEs but worse than LPEs both in terms of technical 
research capability and accumulated improvements. However, because 
management of SOEs is less effective, the indicator of productivity through 
effective management is the lowest. In comparison to SOEs and SMEs, LPEs are 
the most effective in their technical innovation and management. Default costs of 
LPEs are higher than SMEs but lower than SOEs. Similarly, the level of investment 
in self-funding research activities is greater than SMEs but less than SOEs. The 
combined impact of default costs and the total funds paid by LPEs for research 
activities are mid-range in comparison to SOEs and SMEs. Despite better 
performance than SOEs with regards to effectiveness of management, SMEs are 
lowest in all determinants of growth rates. 
 
According to Function (4.10), it is difficult to order the growth rates of SOEs, 
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LPEs and SMEs. Pairwise comparison of each type of firms’ growth will be 
























, the average growth rate of SOEs is 
greater than LPEs. On this basis, if the superiority of SOEs in terms of levels of 
research investment prevails over disadvantages in default costs, management 
effectiveness, technical research capabilities and accumulated technology 
improvements, then the combined effects of technological impacts, default cost 
and management effectiveness are better than LPEs. In this situation, the 
advantages of SOEs outweigh the disadvantages caused by the low growth rate in 
























, the average growth rate of 
SOEs is more rapid than SMEs. The superiority of SMEs in terms of default costs 
and management effectiveness is negated by SOEs’ advantages in technical 
research capabilities, accumulated technology improvements and self-funding 
research investment. The joint effects of technology impacts, default cost and 
management effectiveness are therefore more significant in SOEs than SMEs. In 
this circumstance, the superiority of SOEs in terms of combined effects prevails 

























, the average growth rate of 
LPEs is higher than SMEs. On this basis, LPEs’ weaknesses in default costs are 
outweighed by their technical research capabilities, level of self-funding 
innovation inputs, management effectiveness and accumulated technology 
improvements. As a result, the combination of technology impacts, default cost 
and management effectiveness on LPEs are more obvious than on SMEs. Taking 
into account the fact that LPEs’ combined advantages are more significant than 
their inferior growth rate, the average growth rate of LPEs is actually larger than 
that of SMEs. 
 
Proposition 4.2: Average growth rates of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs are positively 
determined by technical research capabilities, default costs, level of 
self-funding research inputs and total number of each type of firm, but 
negatively influenced by accumulated technology improvements and 
management effectiveness. If superior determinants prevail over inferior 
determinants in comparison to the other types of firms, the average growth 
rate of this type of enterprise is higher. 
 
Summary 
The average growth rates of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs and their determinants are 
discussed in this section. In both the Ex Ante Screening model and the Ex Post 
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Monitoring and Moral Hazard model, two components determine the average 
growth rates of each type of firm. One is the growth rate of the total amount of 
each type of firm; the other is the growth rate caused by technical innovation. If 
one type of enterprise is dominant due to its technical advantages, the scale of 
this type of firm should be limited so that the expansion speed is slower than the 
other two types of firm. However, if one type of firm is disadvantaged in terms of 
technical growth rate (such as SMEs), the government could issue a policy that 
encourages an increase in the number of this type of business so that, when 
compared to the other two types firms, the average growth rate will not as low.  
 
Other factors, such as financial frictions, technology, management effectiveness 
and self-funding capital investment in technology, also determine the growth 
rates of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs. According to the Ex Ante Screening model, 
financing cost and technical research capabilities are two such determinants. The 
average technology-led growth rate of SMEs is the lowest because SMEs are at a 
disadvantage in terms of technical research capabilities and financing cost. The 
rate of technology-led growth in SOEs and LPEs is determined by whether the 
superiority of SOEs in terms of financing cost is more significant than their 
inferiority in technical research capabilities. In the Ex Post Monitoring and Moral 
Hazard model, research capabilities, default cost and self-funding research 
investment positively affected the average technology-led growth rates of SOEs, 
LPEs and SMEs. However, the effects of accumulated technology and 
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management effectiveness are negative. If one type of firms’ advantages 
outweighs their inferiorities when compared to other types of firms, the average 
technical growth rate of this type firm is higher. 
 
4.3.3 Weights of each type of firms in growth of total outputs 
The determinants of average growth rates of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs have been 
examined and compared using the Ex Ante Screening model and Ex Post 
Monitoring and Moral Hazard model. In this section, the weights of SOEs, LPEs 
and SMEs in growth of total production are discussed. 
 
Considering the order of average growth rate of SOEs, LPEs, SMEs, Function (4.1) 
is rewritten as 
  𝑌𝑌 = 𝑦𝑦1𝑆𝑆 + 𝑦𝑦2𝑆𝑆 + 𝑦𝑦3𝑆𝑆             
1, 2 and 3 in this function represent the firms with the highest average growth 
rate, with average growth rate in the middle range. 
 
Similarly, according to the Schumpeterian model, the optimal production for each 
type of firm (Function (4.2)) is transformed into 
𝑦𝑦𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆∗ = Π𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆   
where 𝑂𝑂 ∈ {1, 2, 3}. And Π𝑂𝑂 = 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝜋𝜋𝑂𝑂  
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The production at time 𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,  
𝑦𝑦𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆 = (1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑂𝑂) ∗ 𝑦𝑦𝑂𝑂(𝑆𝑆−1) 
𝑦𝑦𝑂𝑂(𝑆𝑆−1) = (1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑂𝑂) ∗ 𝑦𝑦𝑂𝑂(𝑆𝑆−2) 
The output is optimal at any period. It is supposed that the optimal output at 
time 0 is, 
𝑦𝑦𝑂𝑂0∗ = 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂0𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝜋𝜋�(𝐴𝐴0𝑂𝑂 + 𝜍𝜍𝑂𝑂) 
𝐴𝐴0𝑂𝑂 is the initial productivity of each type of firm. It is assumed that 𝐴𝐴0𝑂𝑂 = 1. 𝜍𝜍𝑂𝑂 
is an indicator of management effectiveness. Let 𝜛𝜛𝑂𝑂 = 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂0𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝜋𝜋(1 + 𝜍𝜍𝑂𝑂) . 
Therefore, the output of each type of firm can be written as, 
𝑦𝑦𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆 = (1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑂𝑂)𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑂𝑂0∗ = (1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑂𝑂)𝑆𝑆𝜛𝜛𝑂𝑂                                  (4.11) 
 
In enterprises with the highest growth rate, the proportion of the total 
production increases over time. However, the weight of the type of firms with the 
lowest growth rate decreases over time. The trend found in the type firms with 
midrange growth is more complex. The relationship of the gap between first and 
second highest growth rates and the gap between the second highest and lowest 




, the weight of 
firms with the second highest growth rate in total production decreases over 
time. 
 
Proposition 4.3: Enterprises that are growing most slowly will gradually be 
forced out of the market, and their weight in the market will decrease 
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overtime. At the same time, the proportion of firms with the highest growth 
rate will increase. Firms with an average growth rate in the middle range 






4.4 Quantitative Analysis: 
In previous parts, it has been discussed that which factors could affect growths of 
SOEs, LPEs and SMEs and their orders. In this part, I will relate theoretical results 
in this chapter to the data reality.  
 
4.4.1 Models with Ex Ante Screening  
Based on theoretical results in previous part, in Ex Ante Screening model, it is 
known that technical research capabilities, financing costs and change rates of 
total number of each type firms will determine the average growths of SOEs, 
LPEs and SMEs and their orders.  
 
In reality, financing cost could be presented by lending interest rate. And Table 
4.3 shows from 2008 to 2013, average lending interest rates of the listed SOEs, 
LPEs and SMEs are 6.94% and 8.82% and 10.76% respectively. And these three 
numbers used to present the value of financing costs of each type firms in reality.  
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Technical research capabilities of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs in China are presented by 
the average value of ratios of new product sales incomes to expenditures on R&D 
from 2012 to 2014 18 . Higher new product sales income with per unit 
expenditure on R&D means higher research capability. However, I can not 
directly get data of LPEs and SMEs on new product sales income and expenditure 
on R&D. I use the ratio of large-sized firms to total firms to calculate the new 
product sales income and expenditure on R&D of LPEs and SMEs19. And average 
values of these ratios of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs from 2012 to 2014 are 11.09, 14.51 
and 8.79 respectively. 
 
The average change rates of total number of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs from 2012 to 
2014 are 0.93, 1.03 and 1.09, which means during the period, total number of 
SOEs decreased while total number of LPEs and SMEs increased, but the increase 
rate of LPEs was smaller than SMEs.  
 
Factor  Method  Type of Firms Value 
Financing Cost Average lending interest 
rate of listed companies 









18 Data on innovation in china, in level of firms, are only available from 2011 to 2014. And change rates of 
total number of each type firms are referred in this model. Therefore, I use data from 2012 to 2014 to do 
quantitative analysis.  
19 The functions I used to calculate related data are 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙−𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠 
× 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 
and 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 − 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 
 71 
                                                        
SMEs 8.79 
Chang rate of total 
number of firms 
Average change rate of 
total numbers of firms 




Table 4.4 VALUES OF FACTORS THAT DETERMINE GROWTH OF SOES, LPES AND SMES  
Original Data Source: CSMAR Database and China Statistics Database. 
 
In addition, parameters are supposed to be 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75. And with each 
value of parameters 𝜋𝜋�  and 𝜎𝜎, impacts of research capability, financing cost and 
change rate of total number of firms on the order of growths of SOEs, LPEs and 
SMEs will be discussed respectively in the next.  
 
Impacts of financing cost 
In this part, I will compare one type of firms with another one, and discus at 
exact what conditions, the relative growth with larger than 1.  
 
Compared growth of SOEs to SMEs, by Graph 4.1, it clearly shows that there is a 




20, which means relative growth of 
SOEs to SMEs (growth of SMEs is normalized to be one) should be more higher if 
the advantage of SOEs in lending interest rate, compared with SMEs, is more 
significant. And when 𝜋𝜋�=0.25 and 𝜎𝜎=0.75, the model fits reality better.  
 
20 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆, 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 present lending interest rates of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs respectively.  
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     𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25            𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 
     𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25               𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 
     𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25               𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
Graph 4.1 COMPARED GROWTH OF SOES TO SMES CONSIDERING IMPACTS OF FINANCING COSTS 
(LENDING INTEREST RATE) 
 
By Graph 4.2, the relationship between relative growth of LPEs to SMEs and 
relative advantage of LPEs in lending interest rate is positive. Also when 𝜋𝜋�=0.25 




     𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25            𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 
     𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25             𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5              𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 
     𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25            𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
Graph 4.2 COMPARED GROWTH OF LPES TO SMES CONSIDERING IMPACTS OF FINANCING COSTS 
(LENDING INTEREST RATE) 
 
It is shown by Graph 4.3 that more significant advantage of SOEs in lending 
interest rates will lead to higher relative growth of SOEs to LPEs. And when 𝜋𝜋� =




     𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25            𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 
     𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25            𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 
     𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25            𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
Graph 4.3 COMPARED GROWTH OF SOES TO LPES CONSIDERING IMPACTS OF FINANCING COSTS 
(LENDING INTEREST RATE) 
 
Impacts of research capability 
Compared growth of SOEs to SMEs, the relative growth of SOEs to SMEs is 
positively affected by relative research capability of SOEs to SMEs. The more 
significant advantage of SOEs in research capability will lead to higher relative 





     𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25            𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 
     𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25             𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 
     𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25            𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
Graph 4.4 COMPARED GROWTH OF SOES TO SMES CONSIDERING IMPACTS OF RESEARCH CAPABILITIES 
 
Graph 4.5 shows that relative growth of LPEs to SMEs is positively related to 
advantages of LPEs in research capability than SMEs. And when 𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 =




     𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25            𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 
     𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25             𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 
         𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25             𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
Graph 4.5 COMPARED GROWTH OF LPES TO SMES CONSIDERING IMPACTS OF RESEARCH CAPABILITIES 
 
In Graph 4.6, the influence of relative research capability of SOEs to LPEs on 
relative growth of SOEs is positive and the model in this chapter could better 




     𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25            𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 




         𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25             𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5            𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
Graph 4.6 COMPARED GROWTH OF SOES TO LPES CONSIDERING IMPACTS OF RESEARCH CAPABILITIES 
 
Impacts of change rates of total number of each type firms 
The relative growth of SOEs to SMEs is positively affected by relative change rate 
of total number of SOEs to SMEs, which is presented by Graph 4.7. And the model 




     𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25            𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 
     𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25             𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 
         𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25             𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5            𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
Graph 4.7 COMPARED GROWTH OF SOES TO SMES CONSIDERING IMPACTS OF CHANGE RATES OF 
TOTAL NUMBER OF EACH TYPE FIRMS. 
 
Graph 4.8 indicates that the relative growth of LPEs to SMEs is higher if the 
disadvantage of LPEs in growth of total number of firms is less significant, 
compared with SMEs. Also the model could describe reality better if 𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 




     𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25            𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5          
 
     𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25             𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5             𝜋𝜋� = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
 
         𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25             𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5            𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
Graph 4.8 COMPARED GROWTH OF LPES TO SMES CONSIDERING IMPACTS OF CHANGE RATES OF 
TOTAL NUMBER OF EACH TYPE FIRMS. 
 
It is clearly shown by Graph 4.9 that relative of growth rate of SOEs to LPEs is 
positively affected by relative change rate of total number of SOEs to LPEs. And 








         𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25             𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5            𝜋𝜋� = 0.75, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75 
Graph 4.9 COMPARED GROWTH OF SOES TO LPES CONSIDERING IMPACTS OF CHANGE RATES OF 
TOTAL NUMBER OF EACH TYPE FIRMS. 
 
Summary 
It has been clearly shown that when 𝜋𝜋� = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75, the model could 
explain the reality better. Under this circumstance, to have higher growth than 
the other two types of frims, the required least relative values of lending rates, 
research capabilities and change rates of total number of one certain type of 
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firms are presented by Table 4.5 
 
Factors/Growth 𝒈𝒈𝑺𝑺 > 𝒈𝒈𝑴𝑴 𝒈𝒈𝑳𝑳 > 𝒈𝒈𝑴𝑴 𝒈𝒈𝑺𝑺 > 𝒈𝒈𝑳𝑳 
Lending rates 𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀












Change rate of total 










Table 4.5 REQUIRED LEAST RELATIVE VALUES OF LENDING RATES, RESEARCH CAPABILITIES AND 
CHANGE RATES OF TOTAL NUMBER OF FIRMS. 
 
Holding research capabilities and change rates of total number of each type firms 
as constants (Ω𝑆𝑆 = 11.09,Ω𝐿𝐿 = 14.51,Ω𝑀𝑀 = 8.79,𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆 = 0.93,𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿 = 1.03 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀 =
1.06), the growth of SOEs should be worse than LPEs and SMEs. Compared with 
SMEs, the disadvantage of SOEs in total number of firms prevails over their 
advantage in lending interest rates. And compared with LPEs, SOEs have 
disadvantages both in research capability and total number of firms, and 
advantage of SOEs in lending rates are not significant as their disadvantages. In 
terms of comparison of growths of LPEs and SMEs, LPEs have disadvantage in 
total number of firms but their research capabilities are in dominant position, 
compared with SMEs. Under this situation, growth of LPEs will be higher than 
SMEs, if the lending rate of SMEs is higher than LPEs, which is true in reality.  
 
However, if lending rates and change rates of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs are 
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considered as constants (𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 = 6.94%, 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 = 8.82%, 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 = 10.76%,𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙 = 0.97,𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿 =
1.03,𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀 = 1.06) , growth of SOEs will be higher SMEs if relative research 
capability of SOEs to SMEs is lager than 3.98 and also higher than LPEs if relative 
research capability of SOEs to LPEs is more than 2.45. And growth of LPEs is 
better than SMEs if relative research capability of LPEs to SMEs is over than 1.58. 
 
In addition, focus on impacts of change rates of total number of SOEs, LPEs and 
SMEs, (𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 = 6.94%, 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 = 8.82%, 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 = 10.76%,Ω𝑆𝑆 = 11.09,Ω𝐿𝐿 = 14.51 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 Ω𝑀𝑀 =
8.79), if SOEs would like to get higher growth than SMEs and LPEs, the relative 
change rates of total number of SOEs to SMEs and LPEs should be larger than 
0.98 and 1.02 respectively. And if relative change rates of total number of LPEs to 
SMEs is larger than 0.97, growth of LPEs will be over than SMEs, which means 
compared wit SMEs, the relative disadvantage of LPEs in total number of firms 
should less significant.  
 
4.4.2 Model with Ex Post Monitoring and Moral Hazard 
It has been discussed that, based on models with Ex Post Monitoring and Moral 
Hazard, growths of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs are determined by their research 
capabilities, change rate of total number of firms. Default costs, level of 
self-funding research capital inputs, accumulated technology improvements and 
management effectiveness. And in the model, the joint effects of level of 
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self-funding research capital inputs, accumulated technology improvements and 
management effectiveness present self-funding research capital inputs per unit 
accumulation technology level. And in the model, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  inversely presents the 
default costs of each type firms. And lending rates of each type firms also could 
measure the value of 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖21. The value of 𝑣𝑣 of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs are 1.935, 
1.926 and 1.901 respectively. And parameter 𝜎𝜎 is assumed to be 0.25, 0.5 and 
0.75. 
 
Graph 4.10 shows that for one certain type of firms, the relative growth of this 
type firms to the other two types is positively related to relative self-funding 
research capital inputs per unit accumulated technology level. This means that if 
the advantage of one certain type firms in self-funding research capital inputs is 
more significant, growth of this type firms will be higher.   
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Graph 4.10 IMPACTS OF SELF-FUNDING RESEARCH CAPTIAL INPUTS PER UNIT ACCUMULATED 
TECHNOLOGY LEVEL.  
 
Table 4.6 shows the required lest relative self-funding research capital per unit 
accumulated technology level of each type firms when 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5 and 
𝜎𝜎 = 0.75. 
 
When 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25, growth of SOEs will larger than SMEs and LPEs if the relative 
self-funding research capital per unit accumulated technology level of SOEs to 
SMEs and LPEs are more than 0.686 and 0.868 respectively. And growth of LPEs 
is higher than SMEs if the relative self-funding research capital per unit 
accumulated technology level of LPEs to SMEs is over than 0.818. 
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When 𝜎𝜎 = 0.5, the relative self-funding research capital per unit accumulated 
technology level of SOEs to SMEs and LPEs should more than 0.151 and 0.527 
respectively, in order to get higher growth of SOEs than SMEs and LPEs. And the 
growth of LPEs will more than SMEs if the relative self-funding research capital 
per unit accumulated technology level of LPEs to SMEs is higher than 0.385. 
 
When 𝜎𝜎 = 0.75, SOEs will have better growth than SMEs and LPEs if relative 
self-funding research capital per unit accumulated technology level of SOEs to 
SMEs and LPEs are over than 4.489 and 1.641 respectively. In addition, the 
growth of SMEs is worse than LPEs when the self-funding research capital per 
unit accumulated technology level of LPEs is more than twice than SMEs.  
 
 𝒈𝒈𝑺𝑺 > 𝒈𝒈𝑴𝑴 𝒈𝒈𝑳𝑳 > 𝒈𝒈𝑴𝑴 𝒈𝒈𝑺𝑺 > 𝒈𝒈𝑳𝑳 













































Table 4.6 REQUIRED LEAST RELATIVE SELF-FUNDING RESEARCH CAPITAL PER UNIT ACCUMULATED 





In this chapter, models are discussed, which is used to examine the average 
growth rates of SOEs, LPEs, and SMEs in China. The model in this chapter follows 
the structure of classic multifactor Schumpeterian model, the main differences 
between this model and existing model are: 
1. Based on Schumpeterian model, model in this chapter is used to analyze 
growth of three type firms (SOEs, LPEs and SMEs) in first, and then indirectly 
to analyze China’s economy that is mainly made up of these three types of 
firms.  
2. The scale effect of labour is not sidestepped in this model. Empirical studies 
of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Laincz and Peretto (2006) show that 
growth rate of economy is not significantly related to population based on 
cross-country data. However, according to Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999), 
even though scale effects may not exist in cross-country analysis, in 
manufacturing industry, there may be scale effects. In this chapter, growths of 
outputs of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs in China are compared, and the theoretical 
results show that scale effect of labour (it is presented by total number of 
firms in this chapter) indeed determine growths of each type firms, especially 
for SMEs that are disadvantaged by research capability and financing cost.  
 
The analysis found that two key elements determine the average growth rates of 
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SOEs, LPEs and SMEs in China. The first is growth rate caused by technology; the 
second is an increase in the total number of enterprises. 
 
Financial frictions, technology, management effectiveness, self-funding research 
investment and increases in scale affect the average growth rate of SOEs, LPEs 
and SMEs. Evidence shows that SOEs face the least financial frictions. In 
comparison, SMEs have the most serious difficulties, due to higher scrutiny over 
their creditworthiness, difficulty in monitoring and high financing costs. In terms 
of technology, LPEs are more effective than SOEs and SMEs. Based on this 
criterion, SMEs perform the worst. Analysis has also found that the management 
effectiveness of SOEs is the worst and LPEs the best. This is due to the nature of 
ownership and organisational scale.  
 
In the Ex Ante Screening model, without considering the effectiveness of 
innovation，the growth rate caused by SOEs’ technical advancement is higher 
than LPEs and SMEs. This is also because fewer financial frictions are imposed on 
SOEs than other types of firms. Because of the high financing cost, the average 
technology-led growth rate of SMEs is the lowest.  
 
However, with considering the effectiveness of innovation， there are more 
circumstances that impact on the technology-led growth rate of these businesses. 
In the Ex Ante Screening model, SMEs’ average growth rate caused by technology 
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is the smallest because SMEs are both disadvantaged through financial 










], the average growth rate of SOEs is larger than LPEs. This is because 
the role played by the financial frictions determiner is greater than that of 
research capabilities.   
 
If the impacts of default costs, management effectiveness, technical research 
capabilities and accumulated technology improvements are less significant than 
self-funding research investment, the average growth rate of SOEs is larger than 
LPEs. Interestingly, the growth rate of LPEs is smaller than SMEs if the positive 
impacts from innovation activities and financial frictions are less than the 
negative impacts from management effectiveness. Unlike SMEs, technical 
research capabilities, accumulated technology improvements and self-funding 
research investment can negate SOEs’ inferiorities in default costs and 
management effectiveness. This in turn increases the average technology-led 
growth rate, meaning it is higher than that of SMEs. In addition, LPEs’ superiority 
in terms of technology research capabilities, amount of self-funding innovation 
inputs, management effectiveness and accumulated technology improvements 
means their average technology-led growth rate is higher than SMEs. 
 
Where one type of firm has a superior average technology-led growth rate but an 
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inferior rate in the increase in the total amount firms (and the superiority is 
more pronounced than the inferiority) this type of firm’s average growth rate is 
higher than the others.  
 
This chapter also considers changes in the number of each type of firm over time. 
Using a defined model, the weights of each type of firm are determined by their 
growth rate. The weight of firms with the highest growth rate increases over time, 
whilst the weight of firms with the lowest growth rate decreases over time. The 
weight of firms with medium growth rate decreases over time if the difference 
between the highest growth rate and the medium growth rate is larger than the 
difference between the medium growth rate and the lowest growth rate. 
 
The models discussed in this chapter have a practical effect on policy making. If 
one type of firm is disadvantaged in terms of its technological growth rate, a 
policy could be established to increase the number of these type firms so that the 
average growth increases. In Report on the Work of the Government 2015, 
non-state-owned enterprises are considered to be the most important part of 
China’s economy, and the development of private firms should be encouraged 
and supported by the government. In China, the majority of private firms are 
small and medium-sized businesses. In order to develop private enterprises, 
particularly privately owned small and medium-sized firms, the government 
could implement policies that tackle two core issues. The first relates to 
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increasing the total number of SMEs and encouraging new business start-ups, in 
order to increase the total number of firms. The second is increasing the 
technology-led growth rate. Policies that reduce financing costs and encourage 
SMEs to invest in research would be hugely beneficial.  
 
The main limitation of this model is that analysis of growth of SOEs, LPEs and 
SMEs are undertaken separately, and then compared their growth. Even though 
this model could explain growth of each type firms in reality, this model does not 
consider linkage effects22 in these three types of firms, which may be studied in 









22 Hirschman (1958) and Holz (2011) think that there are linkage effects of SOEs on private firms.  
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Chapter 5 R&D, Imitation and Economic Growth of 




Since the reform and opening-up policy that began in the mid-1980s, the 
economy of China has grown at an incredible rate, with the average growth rate 
each year up to 10%. However, China gives the world an expression that a huge 
population and low-cost labour is one of the secrets of China’s economic growth. 
In fact, labour-intensive sectors play a key role in China’s growth in the early 
development stage. However, with the increase in labour cost, foreign investors 
gradually disinvest from China's mainland and start to cast their eyes on 
Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia. On the other hand, 
environmental problems, inequality and other domestic issues are challenging 
China’s central government. China has the stress of adjusting the economic 
structure for long-term development.  
 
In the Report on the Work of the Government 2014, Premier Li Keqiang pointed 
out that innovation-driven development will be pursued and the reform of the 
science and technology management system will continue to be deepened. 
Reforming and promoting manufacturing industries and improving indigenous 
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innovation capability are goals of the 12th Five-Year Program in China. At the 
same time, China tries to export it high techniques to other countries, for 
example high-speed rail. It seems that China wants to change from 'Imitation 
China' to 'Innovation China'.  
 
Domestic research and development (R&D) or technology borrowing aboard 
(imitation) are two channels of product and process innovation. Developed 
countries such as the U.S.A, Germany and Japan prefer R&D, while developing 
countries tend to choose imitating advanced technology from advanced countries 
because of limited capital. In other words, technology borrowing abroad may be 
a better way for developing countries to catch up (Lin, 2012, pp13-16). 
 
The research by Fu et al. (2011) shows that indigenous innovation and foreign 
technology are complementary for developing countries. Without proactive 
domestic innovation efforts, the developing countries cannot catch up with the 
developed countries. The foreign technology is static, which is normally 
presented as imported machines. There is a similar finding by Hu et al. (2005) 
that domestic innovation positively affected returns in Chinese firms. Domestic 
and foreign technology transfer is influenced by indigenous R&D capabilities, but 
the complementary relationship between foreign technology transfer and 
domestic innovation in the foreign sector is found to be weak. 
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Imitation is a process of learning advanced technology for developing countries, 
under the economic growth model with imitation and innovation by Mukoyama 
(2003), which makes it possible for developing countries to be an innovator in 
the next round of competition. If the amount of innovation in the equilibrium is 
too little, the better policy for government is providing a subsidy to imitate rather 
than R&D. A subsidy to R&D may result in monopoly distortion. 
 
Before the economic reform, the innovation system in China was centralised 
planning and was over-protected by the government (Cai and Tylecote, 2008). 
After the mid-1980s, China’s innovation system moved away from 
over-protection, and the science and technology outsourcing activities were 
evidently active. In addition, foreign multinational corporations' involvement 
(Liu and White, 2001) and a transition from imitation to innovation (Guan et al., 
2009) were other trends of the innovation system in China. 
 
However, the purpose of innovation for governments and enterprises is different. 
Governments set up long-term goals of science and technology, while enterprises 
are more concerned with short-term maximising profits. The long-term plans of 
domestic innovation by governments actually positively influence the R&D 
activities of enterprises (Chang et al., 2006), and government's support firms’ 




Compared to private enterprises, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more likely 
to engage in R&D activities than imitation. State-owned enterprises play a 
significant role in China’s economic growth. SOEs have externality effects 
(Jefferson, 1998; Lin et al., 1998, 2003) on the society and economy, while private 
firms chase maximising profits. There is a lagged positive relationship between 
state-ownership and innovation performance (Choi et al., 2011). Reformed SOEs 
and other newly established firms lead to the high growth of business groups in 
China (Choi et al., 2011). Business groups evidently influence China’s industrial 
development and technology advancement, (Lee and Hahn, 2005), and are also 
an important factor for enhancing technology and encouraging R&D activities 
(Choi et al., 2011). 
 
Additionally, the study by Guan et al. (2009) whose sample is based on the 
enterprises in Beijing shows objectives of innovation for SOEs and non-SOEs are 
significantly different in terms of the importance of ‘introducing niche products 
of technology’, ‘improving existing technology' to reduce reliance on imported 
equipment/technology and ‘reducing energy consumption’. This study suggests 
SOEs have the responsibilities of long-term development and a national strategy 
in international markets. Because of these responsibilities, SOEs are more likely 
to carry out R&D activities than private enterprises. 
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Overall, the previous studies show that imitation and innovation are two 
channels to improve technology. And in China, SOEs because of their social 
responsibilities seem to more involve in innovation than PEs. However, there is 
less literature to model the difference between SOEs and LPEs in their 
preferences of imitation. The novelties of this chapter are: 
(1) A model is constructed to describe the different choice of state-owned 
enterprises' and private firms' innovation strategies.  
(2) As Chapter 4, size effect is also considered in this model because of the good 
performance of LPEs, such as Huawei, Xiaomi, Sany, on technology 
innovation. The firms in China are divided into three types: SOEs, LPEs and 
SMEs.  
 
The model is built to answer the following questions: 
(1) For all three types of firms (SOEs, LPEs and SMEs) in China, do they all prefer 
imitation rather than innovation all the time? 
(2) Can imitation always improve the growth of productivities of production? 
(3) Which type of firms is the most prefer imitation compared to the other two 
types of firms? 
 
In this chapter, enterprises have to choose an innovation strategy, choosing 
between R&D activities and imitating advanced technology. At the early stage of 
corporation development, private enterprises and SOEs both prefer importing 
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advanced technology abroad. However, the probability of technological 
borrowings decreases with the growth of firms, and owing to higher financing 
costs, it is more possible for private enterprises to choose technology borrowings 
abroad. 
 
5.2 Stylised Facts 
The central government in China considers that it is time for China to change its 
approach to economic growth23 and encourage creation and innovation that is 
considered as the engine of the growth of China in the next few decades. Several 
plans and policies were issued for this purpose, for example the 11th and 12th 
Five-year Program.  
 
5.2.1 Source of domestic expenditure on R&D activities in China 
As seen in Figure 5.1, the gross domestic expenditure on R&D activities in China 
has kept moving ahead since 1991, and the growth increased rapidly after 2002. 
Business enterprises contribute most to R&D activities and provide most of the 
funds for R&D. Government is the second source of funds.  
 
23 This is written down in the Report on the Work of the Government 2014. 
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Figure 5.1 GROSS DOMESTIC EXPENDITURES ON R&D BY TOTAL INTRAMURAL AND SOURCEOF FUNDS 
Unit: Million yuan 
Source: OECD 
 
Figure 5.2 show the source of funds for the R&D activities of business enterprises. 
The contribution of business enterprises is still the most prevalent. Funds from 
abroad and the government make up a small part of the domestic expenditures 




Figure 5.2 REAL GROSS DOMESTIC EXPENDITURES ON R&D BY BUSINESS ENTERPRISES AND SOURCE 
OF FUNDS 
Unit: Million yuan 
Source: OECD 
 
5.2.2 Inputs and outputs of R&D activities in enterprises with 
different ownerships  
According an official report24issued in 2010 concerning R&D activities in China, 
the total amount of expenditure on R&D in 2009 was about 580.21 billion yuan - 
that is 6.5 times the R&D expenditure in 2000. The average annual growth of 
R&D expenditures is 23%, whilst 17% of SOEs and 6.4% of private enterprises 
undertake R&D activities. 30.5% of large-medium sized firms and 6% of 
24 The official report ‘ The report on the nation survey of R&D activities in China in second time’ is posted 
on the website of National Bureau of Statistics of China: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rdpcgb/ 
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small-sized firm works on R&D.25 SOEs seem to have more willingness to carry 
out R&D activities than private enterprises. R&D seems to be more attractive for 
large-medium sized firms than small-sized enterprises.  
 
Table 5.1 shows the amount of funds spent on R&D activities per firm in 2012 
and 2011. The amount of expenditure on R&D activities per state-owned 
enterprise and the amount per private enterprise both increased from 2011 to 
2012, and the amount of expenditure on R&D activities per state-owned 
enterprise is about twenty times the amount per private enterprise. It is 
indicated that state-owned enterprises prefer R&D activities to innovate new 
products and production processes than private enterprises. 
 
The amount of inputs of R&D per enterprise (10 
thousands yuan) 2012 2011 
Total amount 209.46 184.08 
State-owned manufacturing enterprises 1234.77 1090.44 
Private manufacturing enterprises 65.85 52.27 
Table 5.1 THE AMOUNT OF INPUTS OF R&D ACTIVITIES PER ENTERPRISE 
Source: China Statistics Database 
 
Table 5.2 shows the number of applications for patent rights by ownership. The 
25 These percentages are not showed in this official report, these numbers are calculated based on the data 
in this report 
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number of private firms’ applications for patent rights is about twice the number 
of state-owned enterprises. It seems that private enterprises are more motivated 
to carry out R&D activities and have more output than state-owned enterprises. 
However, when the number of each type of firm is considered26, the conclusion is 
different. 
 
The number of application for patent right 2012 2011 
Sate-owned manufacturing enterprises 16660 11611 
Private manufacturing enterprises 39626 29210 
Table 5.2 THE NUMEBER OF APPLICATION FOR PATENT RIGHT BY OWNESHIP 
Source: China Statistics Database  
 
Table 5.3 presents the number of applications for patent rights per firm by 
ownership, which is regarded as an indicator of the probability of R&D activities. 
In table 5.3, in 2012 and 2011, the number of applications for patent rights per 
state-owned enterprises is about ten times the number per private enterprise. It 
is can be concluded that the probability of state-owned enterprises carrying out 
R&D activities is larger than private enterprises. State-owned enterprises have 
more motivation than private enterprises to carry out R&D activities.  
 
 
26 The number of manufacturing state-owned enterprises and private enterprises are showed in Appendix. 
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The number of application for patent right per firm 2012 2011 
Sate-owned manufacturing enterprises 2.03 1.44 
Private manufacturing enterprises 0.21 0.16 
Table 5.3 THE NUMBER OF APPLICATION FOR PATENT RIGHT PER FIRM 
Source: China Statistics Database 
 
Based on the data shown in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, the R&D activities of private 
enterprises seem to be more effective than state-owned enterprises. The input of 
R&D activities per state-owned enterprise is twenty times the input per private 
enterprise; however, the number of applicants for patent rights per state-owned 
firm is only ten times the number per private firm. 
 
Outputs Caused by R&D Activities per firm (10 thousands yuan) 2011 
State-owned manufacturing enterprises 15812.46 
Private manufacturing enterprises 785.04 
Table 5.4 OUTPUTS CAUSED BY R&D ACTIVITIES PER FIRM BY OWNERSHIP 
Source: China Statistics Database 
 
Table 5.4 presents the average value of outputs caused by the R&D activities of 
state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. The average value of outputs of 
state-owned enterprises is about twenty times the average value of outputs of 
private enterprises in 2011. According to this data, state-owned enterprises and 
private enterprises are almost equally as effective on R&D activities.  
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5.2.3 Inputs and outputs of R&D activities in large-medium sized 
enterprises 
Figure 5.3 shows that the inputs of R&D activities in state-owned large-medium 
sized enterprises are much higher than private large-medium sized enterprises 
from 2006 to 2010. During the period, inputs of R&D activities in both 
state-owned and private large-medium sized enterprises increased. Furthermore, 
the growth rate of inputs of R&D activities in state-owned firms is slightly higher 
than private firms. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 AVEARAGE REAL INPUTS OF R&D ACTIVITIES IN LARGRE-MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISE FROM 
2006 TO 2010 
Unit: 10 Thousands yuan 
Source: China Statistics Database  
 
The effectiveness of R&D activities in state-owned and private large-medium 
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sized enterprises is compared in Table 5.5. Private large-medium sized 
enterprises are slightly more effective than state-owned. Private enterprises 
become more effective from 2008 to 2010. The effectiveness of state-owned 
enterprises declines. 
 
The effectiveness of R&D activities（outputs/inputs) in 





2008 17.90 19.30 
2009 17.66 18.24 
2010 16.10 20.64 
Table 5.5 THE EFFECTIVNESS OF R&D ACTIVITIES IN STATE-OWNED AND PRIVATE LARGE-MIEDUM 
SIZED ENTEPRISES 
Source: China Statistics Database 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the trend of average inputs of R&D activities in large-medium 
sized enterprises from 2003 to 2012, which can indicate the probability of 
undertaking R&D activities in larger-medium sized firm. In general, the 
probability of carrying out R&D activities increased from 2003 to 2012. However, 
there was a decrease between 2010 and 2011. This may be caused by the jump of 
the number of large-medium sized enterprises in China, which leads to the 




Figure 5.4 AVERAGE REAL INPUTS OF R&D ACTIVITIES IN LARGRE-MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISE PER 
FIRM FROM 2003 TO 2012 
Source: China Statistics Database 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the trend of the average number of applications for patent 
rights in large-medium sized enterprises, which can also indicate the probability 
of carrying out R&D and outputs of R&D. In general, the trend shown in Figure 
5.5 is similar to the trend in Figure 5.4. Large-medium sized enterprises have 




Figure 5.5 THE AVERGER NUMBER OF APPLICANTS FOR PATENT RIGHT IN LARGE-MEDIUM SIZED 
ENTERISES 
Source: China Statistics Database 
 
5.2.4 Expenditures on technology borrowings (imitation) 
Table 5.6 shows the expenditure on technological borrowings. There is no 
particular trend of expenditure on imitation during the period from 2004 to 
2012. However, comparing expenditures between 2004 and 2012, the total 
amount increased from 54.105 billion yuan to 75.244 billion yuan; the amount 
on technology borrowing slightly decreasing from 39.736 billion yuan to 39.391 
billion yuan; and the amount on learning technology borrowed abroad and 
domestic technology borrowing increased from 6.121 billion yuan to 15.684 
billion yuan, and from 8.248 billion yuan to 20.169 billion yuan respectively. In 
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2004, technology borrowing abroad was the most important channel of imitating 
advanced technology, however, the importance of technology borrowing abroad 
gradually declines. The effects of learning technology borrowed and domestic 
technological borrowings became stronger, and this indicates that the gap 
between domestic technology levels and world technology frontiers becomes 
narrower. 
 
The amount of funds on technology 
borrowings (billion yuan) 
2012 2011 2009 2008 2004 
Total  75.244 87.168 80.758 77.391 54.105 
Technology borrowing aboard 39.391 44.899 42.217 46.691 39.736 
Learning technology borrowed aboard 15.684 20.217 18.2 12.27 6.121 
Domestic technology borrowing 20.169 22.052 20.341 18.43 8.248 
Table 5.6 THE AMOUNT OF EXPENDITURES ON TECHNOLOGY BORRWOINGS 
Source: China Statistics Database  
 
5.2.5 Types of Patents Right Applicants  
According to Figure 5.6, most of the patent rights applicants are utility patents 
from 1995 to 2013, except the period from 2005 to 2010. From 2005 to 2010, 
design patents make up the majority of the total applicants. Before 2008, the 
percentage of utility patents in total applicants significantly decreases but after 
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2008, the number gradually climbs. By contrast, the percentage of design patents 
in total keeps increasing until 2008 and then declines. The percentage of 
invention patents steadily increased from 1995 to 2013, and its percentage was 
the lowest until 2013. In 2013, the percentage of invention patents was more 
than design patents, and became the second-most important source of patent 
rights. It is clearly shown that the most important technological improvement 
channel for China is improving existing techniques. Even though China are worse 
regarding their original techniques, the increasing improvement in the original 
techniques is obvious, and is now the second important channel of patent rights.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 EACH TYPE PATENTS APPLICATIONS IN TOTAL PATENTS APPLICATIONS 
Source: China Statistics Database  
 
The data shown in this part demonstrates that with the development, the 
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innovation strategy of China gradually changed from imitation to R&D. Moreover, 
state-owned enterprises have more motivations to carry out R&D activities than 
private enterprises. The size of enterprise also affects the innovation strategy - 
for example, large-medium sized enterprises are more likely to choose R&D 
activities.  
 
5.3 The Model 
In Chapter 4, determinants of growth rates of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs are discussed, 
as well as how these determinants affect growth rates in terms of the ownership 
of each type of firm. Growth rates are determined by two important factors, one 
is technology causing the growth rate; the other one is the growth rate of 
employees. In Chapter 4, in a simple case, the effective labour supplies per firm of 
each type of firm keeps constant at each period. Therefore, the growth rate of 
employees is presented by an increased rate of the total number of each type of 
firm, which is also the expending speed of each type.  
 
However, in the last chapter, we saw the differences in innovation and imitation 
in terms of technology causing growth rate. This part will focus on how 
innovation and imitation activities could affect technology causing growth rate.  
 
Similarly, in this chapter, it is still supposed that there are three types of firms in 
 109 
China, and they are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), large-sized private 
enterprises (LPEs) and small-sized enterprises (SMEs). As this is concerned with 
technology causing growth rates, the impacts of employment increase rates are 
not referred to in this part. According to Schumpeter's framework, the 





where 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝐿,𝑀𝑀}. S, L and M present SOEs, LPEs and SMEs respectively.  
 
To improve productivities, entrepreneurs have to choose one of two strategies: to 
borrow advanced technology (imitation) or to undertake R&D activities. It is 
supposed that the probability of choosing imitation is 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆. As Chu et al. (2014), 𝑔𝑔∗ 
is the exogenous growth rate of advanced technology of technology frontier in 
world. 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1∗  presents the productivity of technology frontier in world in last 
period, which is also an exogenous variable. 
 
 Innovation Imitation 
Probability of Choosing R&D 
activities or Imitation 
1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 
Probability of succeeding in 
R&D activities or Imitation 
𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆 1 
Technology improvement caused 
by R&D activities or Imitation 
𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 𝑔𝑔∗𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1∗  
Table 5.7 SUMMARY OF TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENT CAUSED BY R&D ACTIVIES OR IMITATION 
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It is clearly shown by Graph 5.1 that the process of entrepreneurs choosing their 
strategy of technology is improving. Entrepreneurs have a chance to import 
advanced technology, and the technology improvement arising from imitation is 
𝑔𝑔∗𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1∗ . Entrepreneurs can also choose to undertake R&D activities in order to 
innovate new products or processes. The chance of successful innovation is 𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆, 
and the gain is 𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1. If entrepreneurs choose to undertake R&D research and 
unfortunately the R&D research fails, the current technology level is the same as 
in the last period and entrepreneurs will thus face the choice between innovation 
and imitation again. The expected technological improvement caused by R&D 
activities is 𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1. Therefore, the expected productivity of each type firms in 
time 𝑡𝑡 is   
                           𝐸𝐸(𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆) = 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 + (1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆)𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔∗𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1∗                                  (5.1) 
 
In the model of Chu et al. (2014), Southern firms could be innovators and 
imitators. And the monopolistic position of domestic innovator in intermediate 
sectors could be replaced by domestic effective imitators and multinational firms. 
Chu et al. (2014) focus on the interaction between imitation and innovation 
performed by two different firms (domestic innovative firms and foreign 
affiliates of Northern firms). In the model of this thesis, as Acemoglu et al. (2003, 
2006), innovation and imitation are performed by the same firm. However, 
different from Acemoglue et al. (2003, 2006), imitation and innovation can not be 
undertaken in the same time. Because of credit constraints, entrepreneurs have 
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to a strategy to improve technology of production: imitation or innovation. If 
innovative activities fail, the technology level keeps the same as previous, and 
entrepreneurs make a choice again of strategies of technology improvement in 
next period.  
 
Simple quadratic cost functions used to present cost of R&D activities and 
imitation 









Θ𝑆𝑆               𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 > 1                                            (5.3) 
𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆  and 𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆  are the amount of investment in R&D activities and imitating 
advanced technology respectively. ?̌?𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 is the productivity before successful 
innovation or imitation occurring. 𝜆𝜆 is a research parameter. ?̅?𝑒 is the imitation 
parameter. Θ𝑆𝑆  presents the patent protection.  
 
 112 
Graph 5.11 PROCESS OF CHOOSING TECHNOLOGY IMPROVING STRATEGY 
 
5.3.1 Without Financial Frictions  
Firstly, a simple case will be discussed where financial frictions of SOEs, LPEs, 
and SMEs are not considered. If there are no financial frictions, the expected 
input for enhancing technology improvement is  
𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆) = (1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆)𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 + 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆                                                       (5.4) 
Because of patent right protection, imitating advanced technology is not free and 
𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆 is the cost of imitating advanced technology from technology frontier. 
 
This chapter only focus on the growth rate caused by technology, therefore, 
according to Schumpeterian model, the optimal production per labour input is  
     𝑦𝑦𝑆𝑆∗� = 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 
The reward from R&D activities or/and imitation is,  
Π⃛ = 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸(?̌?𝐴𝑆𝑆) − 𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆)  
To maximise the reward Π⃛ , and based on Function (5.1) and (5.4), the 







                                                      (5.5) 











= (𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 + 1)
?̌?𝐴𝑆𝑆−1(𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆)𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸
𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸?̅?𝑒
Θ𝑆𝑆             (5.6) 
In this chapter, the geometric mean of the growth rate of exogenous advanced 
technology improvements in each period is introduced to calculate frontier 
technology in the last period.  
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1∗ = (1 + ?̅?𝑔∗)𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−2∗  
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−2∗ = (1 + ?̅?𝑔∗)𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−3∗  
⋮ 
𝐴𝐴1∗ = (1 + ?̅?𝑔∗)𝐴𝐴0∗  
Therefore, 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1∗ = (1 + ?̅?𝑔∗)𝑆𝑆−1𝐴𝐴0∗ . 𝐴𝐴0∗  is the international initial level of 
technology frontiers. It is supposed that the domestic initial level is linearly 
related to the world initial level 𝐴𝐴0∗ = Z𝐴𝐴0 . The gap between the domestic 
















  is the gap of domestic productivity in the last period to initial level.  
 
Equation (5.6) then can be rewritten as  








= (𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 + 1)
(𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆)𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸
𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸?̅?𝑒
Θ𝑆𝑆                            (5.7) 
Based on Equation (5.5) and Equation (5.7), the probability of imitating 
advanced technology with maximising rewards from imitation and/or R&D 
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activities is,  




















                         (5.8) 
The larger accumulated technology increases, which is the ratio of existing 
productivity level to the initial level (𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆−10 ), leads to a lower probability of 
imitation 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆. The technology owned by the firms with a larger 𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆−10  difference 
is more advanced than those with a lower difference and are closer to technology 
frontiers. Comparing them to the initial level, firms with more accumulated 
technology levels have less interesting estimations and have more motivation to 
undertake R&D research activities. Those firms are already in a leading position 
in the competition, and they are more likely to invent new products or innovate 
production processes to maintain their advantage. By contrast, those smaller 
𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆−10  enterprises are at a disadvantage technologically, and they desire to master 
the advanced technology as soon as they can in order to become competitive and 
catch up other competitors. Therefore, firms with smaller 𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆−10  success are more 
likely to choose technology borrowing. 
 
The larger step size of innovation technology 𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆, which is an exogenous variable, 
indicates the technology improvement caused by R&D activities is large. The R&D 
research effectiveness 𝜆𝜆 is negatively related to the probability of imitation. If 
R&D research is more effective, the probability of successful R&D activities is 
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higher. Furthermore, the expected return generated by R&D activities is higher.  
Under these circumstances, the benefits created by R&D activities may be larger 
than those of imitation. The chance of imitating advanced technology decreases, 
and in addition, Θ𝑆𝑆  is the patent protection. Higher Θ𝑆𝑆  means the cost of 
imitation is larger, and so the probability of imitation also declines.  
 
Impacts of Ownership of Enterprises 
In Chapter 4, it is known that the technology research capabilities include step 
size of innovation and R&D research effectiveness (Ω𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖) will affected by 
ownership of firms. The technology research capabilities of LPEs are best with 
SMEs being worst.  
Ω𝐿𝐿 > Ω𝑆𝑆 > Ω𝑀𝑀 
Before China’s economic reform in the 1980’s, private enterprises were not 
allowed to exist. Privatisation of SOEs was one of the important concepts of 
economic reform and SOEs’ reform. SOEs in less important sectors are privatised, 
which is one channel where LPEs in China emanate. The other channel is that 
SMEs gradually grow into LPEs in the market. Therefore, the initial technology 
level of SOEs is the best as SMEs have the worst initial technology level, if the 
initial period is regarded as the start of economic reform in China. Because of the 
two channels of LPEs, the initial technology level of LPEs is in the middle range, 
compared to SOEs and SMEs.  
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Constant gap indicators 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖  present gaps between the technology frontier and 
the technology levels of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs in the initial period. Owing to the 
highest initial technology level, the constant gap indicator of SOEs is the smallest. 
The constant gap indicator of LPEs is in the middle range, and the indicator of 
SMEs is the largest.  
𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆 < 𝑍𝑍𝐿𝐿 < 𝑍𝑍𝑀𝑀 
















, the imitation probability 
















, the imitation 

















imitation probability of SOEs is larger than LPEs. 
 
Compared with SOEs and LPEs, if the distance of SMEs to technology frontiers in 
the last period is larger than SOEs and LPEs, and the R&D research capability of 
SMEs is worse than SOEs and LPEs. Therefore, SMEs have less advantage in R&D, 
and SMEs are more interested in imitation. 
 
However, if the distance of SOEs and LPEs to technology frontiers is larger than 
SMEs, there is a required least advantage in technology research capability of 
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SOEs and LPEs to cover per unit of longer distance of SOEs and LPEs to 






. If SOEs and LPEs can satisfy this 
required least advantage, compared to SMEs, SOEs and LPEs are still better in 
R&D and have less probability to borrow technology. However, if SOEs and LPEs 
can’t satisfy the least research capability, this means SOEs and LPEs don’t have 
enough R&D research capabilities to cover up the longer distance to technology 
frontiers, and then SOEs LPEs will choose imitation with more probability than 
SMEs. 
 
In the comparison between SOEs and LPEs, if the technology gap of SOEs is larger 
than LPEs, and SOEs do not have advantages in research capability, then SOEs 
more prefer imitation than LPEs. However, if the technology gap of SOEs is 







technology research capability of LPEs to cover per unit of longer distance of 
LPEs to technology frontier than SOEs. If LPEs’ advantages in research capability 

















) , LPEs have less 
probability to borrow technology than SOEs. However, if LPEs don’t have enough 
R&D research capabilities to cover up the longer distance to technology frontiers, 
LPEs will more prefer imitation than SOEs. 
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)  in technology research capability to cover per unit of 
differences in technology gap, compared with another type firms, can be 
satisfied, this type firm will have less possibility to choose imitation.  
 
Change of imitation rate over time 
In this chapter, a simple case 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 2 is considered as an example to 
















                                 (5.9) 
𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 > 0 
And it is supposed that 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑍𝑍 (1+𝑔𝑔�
∗)𝑡𝑡−1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1






[ln(1 + ?̅?𝑔∗) − 𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆−1] 
Based on equation (5.9), trend of the probability of each type firms for imitation 

























�              (5.10) 
27 See Proof 5.2 in Appendix 
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By Equation (5.10), 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆








0 ⇔ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆−1 < ln(1 + ?̅?𝑔∗), the probability of imitation increases. Graph 5.2 shows 
that for each type of firm, if the technology causing growth rate doesn’t reach the 
point ln(1 + ?̅?𝑔∗) they prefer to borrow advanced technology and the imitation 
probability increases. Technology causing productivity improvement including 
innovation and imitation is far below the average growth rate of the technology 
frontier, which indirectly shows that the current domestic technology level is far 
behind the technology frontier. The optimal choice is to borrow and learn 




Graph 5.12 TREND OF PROBABILITY OF IMITIATION OVER TIME IF 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆−1 < ln(1 + ?̅?𝑔∗) 
 
In Graph 5.3, if technology causing growth rate is up to ln(1 + ?̅?𝑔∗), the imitation 
probability of each type of firm will decrease over time. If the firms extend to a 
certain scale, 𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 1 is over than the average growth rate of the technology 
frontier, it is not desperate for entrepreneurs now to cover the gap, and they 
would like to undertake R&D activities in order to be in a leading position in 




Graph 5.13 TREND OF PROBABILITY OF IMITIATION OVER TIME IF 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆−1 > ln(1 + ?̅?𝑔∗) 
 
Proposition 5.2: If the technology causing growth rates of SOEs, LPEs and 
SMEs are over 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒈𝒈�∗), enterprises have less probabilities to choose 
imitation in the next round; If the technology causing growth rates of each 
type of firm are lower than 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒈𝒈�∗), it is more possible for firms to 
imitate advantaged technology in the next period.  
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The growth rate of each type of firm considered with R&D activities and 
imitation 
The technology causing growth rates of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs is presented as, 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 = (1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆)𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 +
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔∗𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1∗
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1
= 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆 + �𝑔𝑔∗𝑍𝑍
(1 + ?̅?𝑔∗)𝑆𝑆−1
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆−10
− 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆� 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 
In a simple case that 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 2, according to Equation (5.5) and Equation (5.8), 







,𝐹𝐹 = 𝑍𝑍 (1+𝑔𝑔�
∗)𝑡𝑡−1
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1
0 ,ℑ = �
2𝜋𝜋?̅?𝑙
3Θ𝑡𝑡
, the technology 
causing growth rate with optimal inputs of R&D activities or/and imitation will 
be rewritten as, 






                              (5.11) 
 
In this chapter, the step size of technology improvement 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 , research 














, the technology causing growth rate will increase over 








, the technology causing growth rate will decrease.  
 





 is the requirement of innovation research capability to cover up 
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per unit distance to the technology frontier. 𝜔𝜔∗ = 3𝑔𝑔
∗
𝜋𝜋
 is the lowest requirement. 
If the technology causing growth rate is up to ln(1 + ?̅?𝑔∗) which means the 
distance to technology frontier is already narrowed down to a certain level, 
entrepreneurs are not desperate to cover the gap and they prefer to undertake 
innovation activities in order to obtain a leading position. However, whether this 
action will affect a growth rate increase is determined by the innovation research 
capability of each type of firm. If the innovation research capability could satisfy 
the lowest requirement (𝜔𝜔 > 𝜔𝜔∗), it is good choice to increase the probability of 
innovation and invest less in imitation. However, if firms don’t have enough 
research capability, even though the distance to the technology frontier is 
narrowed down to the certain level, the action of taking more innovation and less 













, the technology causing growth 








, the technology causing 
growth rate will decrease. If the distance to technology frontier is still larger than 
a certain level  [𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆−1 < ln(1 + ?̅?𝑔∗)], entrepreneurs think it is urgent to learn 
advantage technology and their research capability can’t meet the least 
requirement for innovation. Therefore, the strategy taking more imitation rather 
than innovation is better for increasing the technology growth rate. However, if 
the research capability is enough for innovation activities and entrepreneurs 
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prefer to borrow advantaged technology to narrow down the gap to technology 
frontier, in fact, the research capability is underestimated and wasted. Moreover, 
the growth rate will decrease because of ineffective utilisation and innovation 
research capability. 
 
Proposition 5.3: The technology-led growth rate of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs 
increases over time in both two cases: (1) 𝝎𝝎 > 𝝎𝝎∗ and 𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 > 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒈𝒈�∗); 
and (2) 𝝎𝝎 < 𝝎𝝎∗ and 𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 < 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒈𝒈�∗). The technology-led growth rate of 
each type of firm declines over time if 𝝎𝝎 < 𝝎𝝎∗ 𝐚𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐚𝐚 𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 > 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒈𝒈�∗); or 
𝝎𝝎 > 𝝎𝝎∗ and 𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 < 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒈𝒈�∗).  
 
The relationship between probability of imitation and the growth rate of 
each type of firm 
In the last part, the relationship between the technology causing growth rate and 
imitation probability is indirectly shown by the trends of the technology causing 
growth rate. In this part, it will directly study whether the effects of imitation on 
the growth rate are always positive. 












�Ω𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆2                              (5.12) 
According to Function (5.12), it is clear that, if the research capability needed to 










�, then an increase of imitation probability will lead to an 









, an increase of imitation probability will cause the 
technology causing growth rate of each type of firm to decline. There is the least 




. If the research capability of each type of firm to cover up per unit 
distance to the technology frontier cannot satisfy this least requirement, which 
means the research capability for innovation is not strong enough, then imitation 
and learning advanced technology is a better strategy than innovation for each 
firm.  
 
Proposition 5.4: If the research capability needed to cover up per unit 




), imitation won’t promote the technology causing growth 
rate of domestic firms.  
 
5.3.2 With Financial Frictions 
In the previous parts, the trends of probability of imitation, growth rate of 
outputs of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs and their relationships are discussed. However, 
it is assumed that there are no financial frictions. In fact, enterprises have to deal 
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with problems of limited capital when they try to innovate products and 
processes of production, especially with SMEs. As Chapter 4 in this chapter, it is 
also supposed that bank borrowing is the only financing channel for SOEs, LPEs, 
and SMEs. This chapter follows King and Levine (1993) and only concerns the 
Ex-Ante Screening model. 
 
In the model, 𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 is the screening cost. 𝜃𝜃 is the probability that banks can get 
money back. 𝑃𝑃 is the repayment. Then the expected profit of banks will be 𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃 −
𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 
 
It is assumed as a simple circumstance in this chapter that there is perfect 





The benefit from productivity improvement,  




Maximising the benefit from productivity improvement, equations that followed 
are worked out, 




The probability of R&D activities with optimal inputs of R&D activities is  








                                                  (5.13) 
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The imitation probability with optimal inputs of imitation is28 











𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼−1 �𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 − 1 −
𝑓𝑓
𝜃𝜃�� 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸?̅?𝑒







                  (5.14) 













The relationship between financing cost and imitation probability is determined 
by29 


























                       (5.15) 








, financing cost (𝑜𝑜
𝜃𝜃
)  is positively 








, impacts of financing cost on 
probability estimation is negative. 
 
If the research capability to cover up per unit distance to the technology frontier 








), entrepreneurs are deprecated to catch up 
technology frontier. Under this circumstance, if the financing cost is higher, 
entrepreneurs have less motivation to undertake R&D activities because of high 
28 See proof 5.4 in Appendix 
 
29 See proof 5.5 in Appendix 
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cost of failed innovation activities. And according to Proposition 5.4, if the 









), a higher imitation probability will cause the decrease of the 
technology causing growth rate.  
 
If the research capability to cover up per unit distance to technology frontier is 








), then the first task for entrepreneurs 
is to increase the research capability rather than narrow down the technology 
gap. Therefore, undertaking innovation activities become more attractive to firms 
with higher financing costs. Capital invested in technology improvements is 
limited because of financial frictions, and they have to increase the amount in the 
innovation in order to increase the probability of successful innovation activities. 
However, based on Proposition 5.4, in this situation of technology research 
capability, imitation is a good strategy for an increase of technology causing 
growth rates. The less invested in imitation because of higher financing costs will 
lead to declines of technology causing growth rates.  
 
As already discussed in Chapter 4, SMEs have the highest financing costs and 






). Therefore, compared with 
LPEs and SOEs, if SMEs can not satisfy the required least advantage in 
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. SMEs have the highest probability to borrow 
technology rather than undertake R&D activities. And under this situation, 
according to Proposition 4.4, the growth rate of SMEs will be the smallest. 
 









SMEs have stronger motivation to imitate advanced technology rather than 
undertaking R&D activities because of the higher financing costs  
 
5.4 Quantitative Analysis 
In previous part of this chapter, it already discussed preferences of SOEs, LPEs 
and SMEs to imitation, the trend of preference to imitation in China, and 
relationship between imitation and growth of firms. And in this part, the 
theoretical results will be related to data in reality. 
 
In a simple case, it is supposed that 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 1/2,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 1/2  and ?̅?𝑒 = 1 . The 
parameter of patent right protection in China is 3.1, which is the average value of 
standard Ginarte-Park index of patent right in 1995, 2000, and 2005 (Park, 2008). 
The technology gap is inversely measured by relative labour productivities to US 
(labour productivities in US is normalized to one). Data on US labour 
productivities from 1994 to 2014 is obtained from the website of Bureau of 
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Labour Statistics in US. There is no direct data on China labour productivities, 
and read GDP per worked hour (USD, PPP) is used to present the data. According 
to Labour Law in China, there are 250 working days a year and 8 working hours a 
day. Therefor, total worked hours a year used to calculate labour productivity in 
China are supposed to be 2000 hours. And similarly, labour productivities of 
SOEs are presented by the real output30 per worked hour. It is complex to 
calculate labour productivities of LPEs and SMEs. The labour productivities of 
PEs are calculated in first. And it is known that, in last chapter, the research 
capability of LPEs is 1.65 times SMEs. Then it is reasonable to think labour 
productivities of LPEs are also 1.65 times SMEs. The exogenous growth rate of 
technology in technology frontier 𝑔𝑔∗ is presented by average growth rate of US 
labour productivities. In this chapter, the research capabilities of SOEs, LPEs, and 
SMEs are the 1.109, 1.451 and 0.87931.  
 








Average growth rate of US labour 




Technology gap 𝐹𝐹 Inverse relative labour productivities to US 




30 Output=main business income＋inventory－inventory in last period 
31 Research capability=1/10* new products sale income/expenditure on R&D activities.  
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𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒







Average value of standard Ginarte-Park index 





Table 5.8 VALUES OF PARAMETERS IN THE MODEL 
Original Data Source: CSMAR Database, China Statistics Database, Bureau of Labor Statistics in US.  
 
5.4.1 Impacts of ownership of enterprises 
In this chapter, it is known that for one certain type firms, if the required least 
advantage in research capability to cover up per unit of difference in technology 
gap could be satisfied, compared with another type firms, this type firms will 
more prefer innovation rather than imitation.  
 
Zero-line in Figure 5.7 presents the required least advantage and the area up 
zero-line means the required least advantage is satisfied while the area below 
zero-line means that required least advantage is not satisfied.  
 
It is clearly shown by Figure 5.7, compared with SMEs and LPEs, the required 
least advantages of SOEs are not satisfied, and based on the model, SOEs should 
more prefer imitation than LPEs and SMEs.  
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Compared with SMEs, LPEs’ required least advantage is satisfied, therefore, LPEs 
should have less probability to choose imitation.  
 
 
Figure 5.7 REQUIRED LEAST ADVANTAGE IN RESEARCH CAPABILITIES TO COVER UP PER UNIT OF 
DIFFERENCE IN TECHNOLOGY GAP 
 
Figure 5.8 shows the imitation probabilities of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs. As the 
theatrical results, SOEs have more imitation probability than LPEs, and SMEs, 
because SOEs do not satisfy the required least advantage. LPEs more prefer to 
innovation than SOEs and SMEs, because the required least advantages of LPEs 




Figure 5.8 IMITATION PROBABILITIES OF SOES, LPES AND SMES 
 
5.4.2 Change of imitation rate 
Based on the model in this chapter, when growth rate caused by technology 
improvement is up to a certain level [ln (1 + ?̅?𝑔∗)], the probability of imitation 
decreases over time. ?̅?𝑔∗  is geometric mean of exogenous growth rate of 
technology improvements in technology frontier from 2001 to 2014. And the 
value of ln (1 + ?̅?𝑔∗) is 0.91. By Figure 5.9, growth rates caused by technology of 
SOEs are larger than ln (1 + ?̅?𝑔∗) from 2001 to 2014, except in 2013 and 2014. 
During this period, the growth rates caused by technology of LPEs and SMEs are 
also over than ln (1 + ?̅?𝑔∗), except in 2014. Therefore, imitation probability of 
SOEs declines from 2001 to 2012 but increase in 2013 and 2014. LPEs and SMEs 
have decreasing preference to imitation from 2001 to 2014 but more preference 
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in 2014. And Figure 5.8 proves those results.  
 
 
Figure 5.9 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆−1 AND 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 (1 + ?̅?𝑔∗) OF SOES, LPES AND SMES 
 
5.4.3 Growth rate caused by technology considered with R&D 
activities and imitation  
In this part, related data of domestic firms on variables in the model are 
presented by data in country level rather than firms level, and sample size 
expends (1994 to 2014) in order to clearly show the results. Then the research 
capability is 1.5 calculated by the same method in Table 4.8. Technology gap 




It is clearly shown by Figure 5.10 that in the sample 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆−1 > ln(1 + ?̅?𝑔∗), and 
Figure 5.11 shows from 1994 to 2013, 𝜔𝜔<𝜔𝜔∗ but 𝜔𝜔>𝜔𝜔∗ in 2014. Based on 
Proposition 4.3, the technology-led growth rate should decline from 1994 to 
2013. And in 2014, the growth rate increases. And Figure 5.12 proves this, in 
2014, the technology-led growth rate slightly increase than 2013.  
 




Figure 5.11 𝜔𝜔 AND 𝜔𝜔∗ 
 
 






This chapter constructs a model to describe the innovation strategy of SOEs, 
LPEs and SMEs. At the early stage of development, it may be a good choice for 
each type of firm to be imitating advanced technology. However, when the growth 
rate of each type reaches a certain level and if the innovation research capability 








), then SOEs and LPEs and SMEs 
need to carry out R&D activities to keep the growth rate increasing, and the 
probability of each type of firm, in this situation, decreases.  
 
The relationship between probability of imitation and technology causing growth 
rate of domestic firms are negative, if research capability needed to cover up per 





In addition, the model in this chapter indicates that financing cost is negatively 
related to the chance of carrying out R&D activities if the research capability to 









). Under these circumstances, because of the highest financing costs 
that were discussed in Chapter 4, SMEs have more motivation than SOEs and 
LPEs to choose imitation. 
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The conclusions suggest some policy implications. If the government tries to 
enhance indigenous innovation, they need to help enterprises reduce the 
financing cost, for example by providing subsidy, encouraging banking sectors to 
decrease the interest rates of bank borrowing for R&D activities and imitation, or 
providing guarantees for credits - especially for SMEs to reduce their credit risks. 
The government of China now gradually cancels frictions of establishing banking 
sectors and encourages private banking sectors to diverse the channel of 
financing, which can promote the technology improvement. 
 
Regarding patent rights protection, Chu et al. (2014) pointed out that in the 
earlier developing stage, strong IPR protection will hurt the social welfare, and 
they suggested that for developing countries, IPR protection should be gradually 
strengthened with a decrease in distance to the technology frontier. This chapter 
has similar points. Patent rights protection negatively affects the imitation 
probability of firms, and when the least research capability to cover up per unit 
distance to the technology frontier is not satisfied, imitation will promote the 
technology causing growth rate. Therefore, if the research capability of domestic 
firms is not up to the given level, the government could weaken the patent rights 
protection to promote the growth rate.  
 
The limitations of this chapter are that the growth rate of the technology frontier 
is considered as exogenous and a constant, which is not true in reality, and that 
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the step size of domestic innovation is also considered as an exogenous constant, 
but in fact it may be endogenous, which changes over time and is related to 



















Chapter 6 Endogenous innovative steps model 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The innovation strategy of firms in China was discussed in Chapter 5 and the step 
size of domestic innovation in the model is considered to be exogenous.  
 
However, Romer (1990) thinks that new technology production is determined by 
the research labour and accumulated technology level. The growth rate of 
technology is affected by research labour, and the effects are positive. 
 
Jones (1995) has similar points. However, in his model, the step size of 
technology improvements is determined by research labour and the accumulated 
technology level. The ‘fishing out effect’ occurs if the impact of the accumulated 
technology level is negative. This means that the more advanced technology is 
more difficult to achieve. In a lower technology level, new technology is easier to 
produce. However, in a higher technology level, it is more difficult to obtain new 
technology.  
 
Research funds are considered to be another factor that will affect new 
technology production by Rivera-Batize and Romer (1991) and Jones and 




Cheung and Lin (2004) think of research funds as capital input in new 
technology production. Yan et al. (2010) combined these models and concluded 
new technology production is affected by research labour, research funds and 
accumulated technology level. Yan et al. (2010) use cross-province panel data 
from 1998 to 2007 to estimate new knowledge production in China. Except 
research labour, research funds and accumulated technology level, impacts of FDI, 
importing production facilities from abroad, accumulated technology level in 
other provinces are also consider in their estimation model. And their empirical 
results support Jones (1995) that there is no scale effect in the knowledge 
production and the power of accumulated technology is lower than 1. 
 
As Yan et al. (2010), in this chapter, step size is determined by research labour, 
research capital and accumulated technology level. And based on Jones (1995) 
and empirical results of Yan et al. (2010), this thesis also think in China, step size 
of technology improvement is negatively affected by the accumulated technology 
level because of the ‘fishing out effect’.  
 
This chapter focus on step size of three type firms in China (SOEs, LPEs and 
SMEs), and does not consider impacts of FDI. Therefore, different from Yan et al. 
(2010), ‘spillover effects’ and ‘crowding out effects’ of FDI and ‘raising the bar 
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effects’ and ‘spillover effects’ between provinces are not included in this chapter. 
The key difference between this chapter and Jones (1995) is that impacts of 
research capital are not neglected.  
 
This chapter will analyse the firms’ strategy of technology improvements, 
including undertaking R&D activities and imitating advanced technology from 
the technology frontier in world. The trend of imitation rate is also discussed in 
this chapter. In addition, the impact of the trend of imitation on technology 
causing growth is analysed.  
 
6.2 The model 
In the model, the step size of domestic innovation is assumed to be endogenous 
and related to research funds, the structure of ownership, the research labour 
input and the accumulated technology level in the last period. If the R&D 
activities are successful, then the technology improvements caused by this 
successful domestic innovation produced in period 𝑡𝑡 are: 
                                𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆� − 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 = ∆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆� = 𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝛽𝛽 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝜖𝜖𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1
𝜒𝜒           𝛽𝛽 > 0 , 𝑗𝑗 > 0                 
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆�  is the current accumulated technology level with successful innovation 
activities. ∆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆�  is the new technology production resulting from successful R&D 
activities in time 𝑡𝑡. 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 is research labour input and 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 is R&D funds which are 
capital input for R&D activities. 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 is accumulated the technology levels in the 
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last period. According to Jones (1995), it is assumed that 𝜒𝜒 < 1, which means 
that as a higher accumulated technology level, new technology is more difficult to 
achieve. 𝛿𝛿 presents the efficiency of innovation activities. In general, SOEs could 
be considered to be less efficient than PEs. In terms of size effect, LPEs are more 
efficient than SMEs.  
 
On the other hand, the new technology production caused by R&D activities is 
presented by the step size of domestic innovation and the accumulated 
technology level.  
                                            ∆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆� = 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆� − 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 = 𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1                                                        
𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆 is the domestic innovation step size. Therefore, the step size of innovation can 
be presented as follows,  
                                                              𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆 = 𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝛽𝛽 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝜖𝜖𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1
𝜒𝜒−1                                                 (6.1) 
As in Chapter 5, the capital investment in R&D activities 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 is 





               𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 > 1                               (6.2) 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆 is the probability of succeeding in R&D activities. 
 
Technology improvements are caused by R&D activities and imitating advanced 
technology. The expected productivity in time 𝑡𝑡 is, 
𝐸𝐸(𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆) = 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 + (1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆)𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔∗𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1∗                
𝑔𝑔∗ is the exogenous growth rate of advanced technology on the world technology 
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frontier, and 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1∗  is the accumulated technology level in the last period in the 
world technology frontier. 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆  is the probability of enterprises choosing the 
strategy of imitating advanced technology from the technology frontier.   
 
The expected input for enhancing technology improvement without financial 
friction is:  
                      𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆) = (1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆)𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 + 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆                               
Because of patent right protection, imitating advanced technology is not free and 
𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆 is the cost of imitating advanced technology from the technology frontier.  
 
According to the Schumpeterian model, the optimal production per labour input 
is:  
     𝑦𝑦𝑆𝑆∗� = 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 
The reward from R&D activities or/and imitation is,  
Π⃛ = 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸(?̌?𝐴𝑆𝑆) − 𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆)  
As Chapter 4 shows, to maximize the reward Π⃛ caused by innovation and 
imitation, optimal input of R&D activities is: 
                                    𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆∗ = �𝜋𝜋𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆 �  𝑗𝑗 +
1
𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼













                      (6.3) 
If firms decide to undertake R&D activities to improve technology, then the 
expected technology improvement caused by innovation is:  
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𝐸𝐸�Δ𝐴𝐴?⃛?𝑆� = 𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 = 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝛽𝛽 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝜖𝜖+ 1𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1
𝜒𝜒− 1𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼                   𝑗𝑗 +
1
𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼
 < 1  
 
The total influence of research funds on step size and the probability of 
successful R&D activities is presented by 𝑗𝑗 + 1
𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼
. The marginal expected 
technology improvement caused by innovation will decrease with the growth of 
the research funds. Based on Equation (6.3), the optimal research funds for 
innovation are positively related to the research labour input in R&D activities. 
However, if 𝑗𝑗 + 1
𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼
> 1, the marginal expected technology improvement caused 
by innovation will increase with the growth of the research funds. The expected 
technology improvement caused by innovation is driven by the research funds. In 
this case, according to Equation (6.3), the optimal research funds for innovation 
are negatively related to research labour input in R&D activities, which is not 
realistic. Therefore, considering the reality, the assumption 𝑗𝑗 + 1
𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼
 < 1  is 
reasonable. For simple, 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 is supposed to be 2, and in this case 𝑗𝑗 should be 
larger than 0 but smaller than 0.5 (0 < 𝑗𝑗 < 0.5). 
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Graph 6.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXPECTED TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENT, WHICH IS 
CAUSED BY INNOVATION, AND RESEARCH FUNDS 
 
Based on equation (6.1) and (6.3), the step size with optimal research funds for 
R&D activities is: 




2𝜖𝜖−1                                                (6.4) 










Similarly, the probability of successful innovation with optimal research funds is 
obtained by Equations (6.2) and (6.3), 




2𝜖𝜖−1                                             (6.5) 
 147 







It is clearly shown by Equations (6.4) and (6.5) that the optimal step size and 
optimal probability of successful R&D activities are positively affected by 
research labour input in R&D activities. In reality, the higher the technology level, 
the more difficult successful R&D activities are and the more difficult it is to 
achieve a higher step size of technology improvements. Therefore, the optimal 
step size and optimal probability of successful R&D activities should be 
negatively affected by accumulated technology level in last period, which means: 
𝑗𝑗 + 𝜒𝜒 < 1.  
 
6.2.1 Trend of probability of imitating advanced technology over time  
It is known that in a simple case when 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 = 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 = 2, the optimal possibility of 
imitating advanced technology while maximising the rewards of imitation and 












where 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1
∗
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1
. 𝐹𝐹 is the gap between the advanced technology level abroad and 
the domestic technology level in the last period. According to Equations (6.4) and 
(6.5), the possibility of imitation can be rewritten as, 
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                                      (6.6) 







. It is already known that 𝑗𝑗 + 𝜒𝜒 < 1 and 
0 < 𝑗𝑗 < 0.5. Therefore, 𝑓𝑓 is positively related to research labour input in R&D 
activities but negatively affected by the accumulated technology level in the last 
period. 𝑓𝑓 is the function that presents the ratio of research labour input in 
current period to the accumulated technology level in last period. A higher value 
of 𝑓𝑓 means higher research labour inputs to the accumulated technology level. 
Therefore, 𝑓𝑓  could indicate research labour input per unit accumulated 
technology level in last period. If 𝑓𝑓 decreases, then the research labour inputs 
per unit accumulated technology level in the last period declines. In addition, 𝜋𝜋 
presents the effectiveness of R&D activities and its impact on the possibility of 
imitating advanced technology is negative.  
 























� �      (6.7) 
It is known that �1
2





 must be satisfied. In fact, 𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕
 presents the research labour input required, 





 is the upper bond for research labour input with 
optimal research capital input. If firms or countries could hire enough research 





), then they would have to potential 
to achieve the technology frontier and imitating advanced technology would not 





 holds, the trend of imitation 





− 𝑗𝑗� 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 �𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
� .  
 
Proposition 6.1: If 𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 < 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒈𝒈∗���) ⇔
𝝏𝝏𝝏𝝏
𝝏𝝏𝒕𝒕
> 𝟎𝟎  and 𝒍𝒍𝒕𝒕 <
𝟏𝟏−𝝐𝝐−𝝌𝝌
𝜷𝜷
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(𝟏𝟏 + 𝑷𝑷�) ⇔
𝝏𝝏𝒇𝒇
𝝏𝝏𝒕𝒕
< 𝟎𝟎32, the trend of imitation increases over time.  
 
𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆 is the growth rate of the research labour input and 𝑃𝑃� is the average growth 
rate (geometric mean) of the domestic technology causing growth rate. If the 
domestic technology causing growth rate is lower than 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛(1 + 𝑔𝑔∗���), then the 
technology gap of domestic firms to the technology frontier expands. At the same 
time, if the research labour growth rate cannot catch up to the average domestic 
technology causing growth rate [𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆 <
1−𝜖𝜖−𝜒𝜒
𝛽𝛽
𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛(1 + 𝑃𝑃�)], then the research labour 
input per unit of domestic accumulated technology level in last period will 
decrease. Under these circumstances, firms will be in a difficult position wherein 
there is not enough research labour to deal with the increasing technology gap. 
32 See Proof 6.2 in Appendix.  
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Therefore, imitation seems to be a better choice for firms than innovation. The 
possibility of imitation will increase over time. 
 
Proposition 5.2: If 𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 > 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒈𝒈∗���) ⇔
𝝏𝝏𝝏𝝏
𝝏𝝏𝒕𝒕
< 𝟎𝟎  and 𝒍𝒍𝒕𝒕 >
𝟏𝟏−𝝐𝝐−𝝌𝝌
𝜷𝜷
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(𝟏𝟏 + 𝑷𝑷�) ⇔
𝝏𝝏𝒇𝒇
𝝏𝝏𝒕𝒕
> 𝟎𝟎33, the trend of imitation decreases over time.  
 
In this situation, firms are in a better position in that the technology gap is 
decreasing while there are enough research labour inputs. R&D activities are 
now a better choice than imitation for firms 
 
Proposition 5.3: If 𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 < 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒈𝒈∗���) ⇔
𝝏𝝏𝝏𝝏
𝝏𝝏𝒕𝒕
> 𝟎𝟎, 𝒍𝒍𝒕𝒕 >
𝟏𝟏−𝝐𝝐−𝝌𝝌
𝜷𝜷








， the trend of imitation activities of firms increases over 
time. 
 
In this case, the gap to the technology frontier is being widened if the technology 
causing growth rate (𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆−1) is lower than ln(1 + 𝑔𝑔∗���), and the research labour per 
unit accumulated technology level is increasing if the growth rate of R&D labour 
is up to 1−𝜖𝜖−𝜒𝜒
𝛽𝛽
𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛(1 + 𝑃𝑃�). 𝑔𝑔
∗
�12−𝜖𝜖�𝜅𝜅
 is the least growth required of research labour 
per unit accumulated technology level to cover the per unit increase in the 
33 See Proof 6.2 in Appendix.  
 151 
                                                        
technology gap. If the least growth 𝑔𝑔
∗
�12−𝜖𝜖�𝜅𝜅
is satisfied, the trend of imitation 
activities will decrease over time, and firms will prefer to innovate new 
technology to improve technology rather than imitate advanced technology 
abroad. Otherwise, imitation activities are more attractive for firms than 
innovation.  
 
Proposition 5.4: If 𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 > 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒈𝒈∗���) ⇔
𝝏𝝏𝝏𝝏
𝝏𝝏𝒕𝒕
< 𝟎𝟎, 𝒍𝒍𝒕𝒕 <
𝟏𝟏−𝝐𝝐−𝝌𝝌
𝜷𝜷








， the trend of imitation activities of firms increases over 
time. 
 
The greatest decrease in research labour per unit accumulated technology level 
for per unit decrease in technology gap is 𝑔𝑔
∗
�12−𝜖𝜖�𝜅𝜅
if the research labour per unit 
accumulated technology level and the gap to the technology frontier are both 
declining. When 𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
 exceeds the most decrease 𝑔𝑔
∗
�12−𝜖𝜖�𝜅𝜅
, the loss of research 
labour is higher than the decline in the technology gap and there is not enough 
research labour. Under this circumstance, imitating advanced technology is 
preferable to undertaking R&D activates.  
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6.2.2 The influences of probability of imitation on technology causing 
growth rate 
As in Chapter 4, the expected technology causing growth rate of firms is 
presented as, 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 = (1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆)𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆 +
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔∗𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1∗
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1
= 𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆 + [𝑔𝑔∗𝐹𝐹 − 𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆]𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 
The impact of the probability of imitating advanced technology on expected 
technology causing growth rate is: 
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆
= 𝑔𝑔∗𝐹𝐹 − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆 = 𝑔𝑔∗𝐹𝐹 − 𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓 
 





, technology causing growth rate is positively 


















 which means there is not enough R&D labour to cover the 
technology gap, increasing the preference of firms to imitate advanced 
technology will lead to a higher growth rate caused by technology improvements. 








], that increasing reference to imitation will cause a lower technology 
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causing growth rate. Therefore, in this case, firms should gradually change their 
technology improvement pattern and undertake more R&D activities and less 
imitation activities, otherwise it is waste of research labour.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
This Chapter is an extension of Chapter 5 wherein step size of innovation is 
considered to be endogenous and is determined by research labour input and 
research capital.  
 
Considering step size of innovation to be endogenous, the probability of imitating 
advanced technology from the technology frontier to improve technology is 
positively affected by the distance to the technology frontier but negatively 
influenced by the effectiveness of R&D activities and research labour for the per 
unit accumulated technology level, while in Chapter 5, because of the exogenous 
innovative step size, the impact of distance to the technology frontier is positive 
but the influence of the technology research capability is negative. 
 
The trend of the possibility of choosing to imitate advanced technology is 
determined by whether the technology gap could be narrowed down to a certain 
level [ln(1 + 𝑔𝑔∗���)] in Chapter 5. However, if innovative step size is assumed to be 
endogenous, then there are more complex situations to be discussed in this 
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Chapter. Generally, it is determined by the technology gap and research labour 
input.  
 
In addition, whether the technology causing growth rate will increase is 
determined by the probability of imitating advanced technology and the research 
labour required to close the technology gap. If the research labour input to cover 
per unit technology gap is lower than 𝑔𝑔
∗
𝜅𝜅
, then the technology causing growth 
rate is positively affected by the probability of imitating advanced technology. 








 holds, increasing preference to 
imitation will lead to a decrease in the technology causing growth rate.  
 
Overall, the impact of research labour input is stressed in the endogenous 
innovative step size model. The findings of this chapter will be helpful for the 
government to set policies which encourage firms to take R&D activities and 







Chapter 7 Final Conclusions 
 
Based on the Schumpeterian model, this thesis determines the average growth 
rates of SOEs and PEs in two parts: increase rates of scale effect and technology 
causing growth rates. The average growth rates of SOEs and PEs are compared 
with consideration of financial friction. In addition, preferences of innovation 
strategy and trends of preference for imitating advanced technology of SOEs and 
PEs are analysed.  
 
In the analysis of the average growth rates of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs, in the En 
Ante Screening model, and Ex Post Monitoring and Moral Hazard model, the 
order of the average growth rates of each type of firm is determined by whether 
their advantages in technology causing growth rates exceed their disadvantages 
in scale. If a certain type of firm has a dominant position in technology causing 
growth rates, then, to control their average growth rate, their rate of expenditure 
must be lower than the other two types of firms.   
 
In terms of technology causing growth rates, SMEs grow the slowest in the En 
Ante Screening model. The order of technology causing growth rates of LPEs and 
SOEs is determined by the advantages of SOEs in financing, if the cost is 
significant then the LPEs have the advantage in terms of research capabilities.  
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In addition, in the Ex Post Monitoring and Moral Hazard model, technology 
growth rates are positively affected by research capabilities, default costs and 
self-funding research investment but negatively influenced by accumulated 
technology improvements and management effectiveness. If a certain type of 
firm is superior in some determinants of technology causing growth rates then it 
could prevail over their weakness in other determinants resulting in a higher 
average technology-led growth rate for this firm type.  
 
The proportion of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs in total production in the market are 
determined by their growth rates. The proportion of firms with the highest 
growth rate increases over time, however, the proportion of firms with the lowest 
growth rate decreases. The weight of firms with medium growth rate increases 
over time if the difference between the highest growth rate and the medium 
growth rate is lower than the difference between the medium growth rate and 
the lowest growth rate. 
 
With the exogenous step size of technology improvements, based on the 
Schumpeterian model, a new model was constructed to describe the innovation 
strategy, which will increase the total factor productivities. To the improve 
technology level in the next period, firms will choose between either learning 
advanced technology from the technology frontier or undertaking R&D activities.  
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In this model, research capability and distance to the technology frontier 
determine the choice of innovation strategy for SOEs, LPEs, and SMEs. At the 
early stage of development, imitating advanced technology from the technology 
frontier is a better choice than undertaking R&D activities for each firm type. For 
one certain type firms, if the required least advantage in technology research 
capability to cover per unit of differences in technology gap could be satisfied, 
this type firm will have less possibility to choose imitation.  
 
However, if the growth rates of each type of firm meets a certain level and its 









the probability of choosing imitation will decrease in order to improve 
technology causing growth rates.  
 
If the research capability required to compensate for the per unit distance to the 
technology frontier exceeds 2𝑔𝑔
∗
𝜋𝜋
, then the probability that imitation will harm the 
technology-led growth rates of domestic firms will increase. 
 
In addition, the impacts of financing costs are discussed in this model. They are 
negatively related to the probability of carrying out R&D activities if the research 
capability to compensate for the per unit distance to the technology frontier can 








). Therefore, it can be concluded that 
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SMEs prefer imitation and their technology-led growth rate is the lowest because 
of the highest financial costs.  
 
If the step size of technology improvements is endogenous, which is determined 
by the accumulated technology level, research funds and research labour, the 
innovation strategy will affected by the distance to the technology frontier, the 
effectiveness of R&D activities and research labour per unit of the accumulated 
technology level. There are more complex situations regarding trends of 
probability of imitating advanced technology. Generally, it is determined by the 
technology gap and research labour. In addition, the probability of imitating 
advanced technology and research labour required to compensate for the 
technology gap will determine whether the technology-led growth rate will 
increase.  
 
The models discussed in this thesis could offer some suggestions for the 
government’s policy making. Based on the theories in this thesis, there are two 
ways to develop a certain type of firm. One is increasing the increase rate of the 
total number of this type of firm. The other is improving the total factor 
productivity that is affected by technology improvement. Policies about reducing 
the financing cost and encouraging research investment could be issued. Lower 
financing costs would also enhance domestic innovation.  
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In order to promote total factor productivities, the government could weaken the 
patent rights protection if the domestic research capability is worse than the 
least required research capability to compensate for the per unit distance to the 
technology frontier as, in this situation, patent rights protection negatively affects 
the imitation capability of firms and imitation will promote the technology 
causing growth rate. In addition, the models in Chapter 5 and 6 may be helpful 
for the government to make policies which encourage SOEs, LPEs and SMEs to 
undertake R&D activities and narrow the gap with the technology frontier. 
 
Financial frictions play important role in this thesis, which accounts for the 
different financing cost of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs for research activities. In this 
thesis, I use two methods to model financial frictions Ex Ante Screening model 
(King and Levine, 1993) and Ex Post Monitoring and Moral Hazard Model 
(Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty, 1999).  
 
According to Calomiris and Ramirez (1996), there are four types of financial 
frictions: information cost, control cost, monitoring cost and market 
segmentation. The two methods used in this thesis indicate information cost and 
monitoring costs. Control cost and market segmentation are not included in the 
model.  
 
Another key limitation of these two methods, only consider one financing 
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channel: borrowing from banks. Other financing channels such as stock market  
(Levine and Zervos, 1998a, 1998b) are not included. In addition, law system in a 
country could also affect financial frictions (Levine, 1998, 1999, 2000; Levine et 
al., 2000). 
 
However, base on reality in China, even though SOEs more heavily rely on bank 
loans for financing while PEs rely more significantly on retained earnings, family 
and friends (Dollar and Wei, 2007; Riedel et al., 2007), borrowing loans from 
banks is a main financing channel. And stock market still play an insignificant 
role to PEs despite that stock market in China grows rapidly (Gregory and Tenev, 
2001). Therefore, it is reasonable to focus on financial intermediate sector – 
banks to model financial frictions.  
 
The method, Ex Post Monitoring and Moral Hazard Model, used in this thesis is 
similar as the method used by Aghion, et al. (2005), where credit multiplier 
presents the level of financial development. However, Acemoglu et al. (2006) use 
retained earnings as financing channel of firms. In Schumpeterian theory, 
methods used to model financing friction should clearly show financing cost of 
R&D activities. The two method used in this model could accomplish this task. 
 
This thesis analysed the growth of SOEs and PEs and their innovation strategy in 
theory. The most important limitation of this thesis is that the impacts of FDI are 
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not considered. In fact, in developing countries, FDI could significantly improve 
technology in the early stages of development. The analysis of the growth of SOEs 




















Appendix 4.1 Structure of SOEs in China 
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Proof 4.1 Proof of proposition 1 
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Proof 4.2 Proof of proposition 2  











































































































ℂ𝑆𝑆 > ℂ𝐿𝐿 






































ℂ𝑆𝑆 > ℂ𝑀𝑀 




























































ℂ𝐿𝐿 > ℂ𝑀𝑀 













Proof 4.3 Proof of proposition 3 







𝑦𝑦1𝑆𝑆 + 𝑦𝑦2𝑆𝑆 + 𝑦𝑦3𝑆𝑆
 =  
1



















𝑦𝑦1𝑆𝑆 + 𝑦𝑦2𝑆𝑆 + 𝑦𝑦3𝑆𝑆
=
1



















𝑦𝑦1𝑆𝑆 + 𝑦𝑦2𝑆𝑆 + 𝑦𝑦3𝑆𝑆
=
1













   
 
Let 𝜚𝜚 presents the ratio of two types firms’ growth rate and 𝑊𝑊 indicates the 
ratio of two types firms’ 𝜛𝜛. Weights of each type firms can transformed into 
𝑛𝑛1𝑆𝑆 =
1
1 + (𝜚𝜚12)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊12 + (𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊13
     
𝑛𝑛2𝑆𝑆 =
1




1 + (𝜚𝜚31)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊31 + (𝜚𝜚32)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊32
 
 




(−1)[𝑊𝑊12(𝜚𝜚12)𝑆𝑆 ln 𝜚𝜚12 + (𝜚𝜚13)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊13 ln 𝜚𝜚13]
[ 1 + (𝜚𝜚12)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊12 + (𝜚𝜚13)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊13]2




(−1)[𝑊𝑊21(𝜚𝜚21)𝑆𝑆 ln 𝜚𝜚21 + (𝜚𝜚23)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊23 ln 𝜚𝜚23]





(−1)[𝑊𝑊31(𝜚𝜚31)𝑆𝑆 ln 𝜚𝜚31 + (𝜚𝜚32)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊32 ln 𝜚𝜚32]




Weight of a certain type firms with highest average growth rate 
ln 𝜚𝜚12 < 0 
ln 𝜚𝜚13 < 0 
Therefore, I get the followings, 
𝑊𝑊12(𝜚𝜚12)𝑆𝑆 ln 𝜚𝜚12 < 0 
(𝜚𝜚13)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊13 ln 𝜚𝜚13 < 0 
𝑊𝑊12(𝜚𝜚12)𝑆𝑆 ln 𝜚𝜚12 + (𝜚𝜚13)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊13 ln 𝜚𝜚13 < 0 




(−1)[𝑊𝑊12(𝜚𝜚12)𝑆𝑆 ln 𝜚𝜚12 + (𝜚𝜚13)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊13 ln 𝜚𝜚13]
[ 1 + (𝜚𝜚12)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊12 + (𝜚𝜚13)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊13]2
  > 0                
The proportion of a certain type firms with highest average growth rate increases 
over time. 
 
Weight of a certain type firms with middle range growth rate 
 
If 𝑔𝑔3 < 𝑔𝑔2 < 𝑔𝑔1, I get 𝜚𝜚21 > 1 and 0 < 𝜚𝜚23 < 1 
It then can be calculated that ln 𝜚𝜚21 > 0 and ln 𝜚𝜚23 < 0 
I get the followings, 
𝑊𝑊21(𝜚𝜚21)𝑆𝑆 ln 𝜚𝜚21 > 0 
(𝜚𝜚23)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊23 ln 𝜚𝜚23 < 0 
It is difficult to directly tell whether value of 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑2𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆
is negative or positive. 
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𝑊𝑊21(𝜚𝜚21)𝑆𝑆 ln 𝜚𝜚21 + (𝜚𝜚23)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊23 ln 𝜚𝜚23 > 0 
𝑊𝑊21(𝜚𝜚21)𝑆𝑆 ln 𝜚𝜚21 > −(𝜚𝜚23)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊23 ln 𝜚𝜚23 




�                                          
Based on the followings,  



















































ln �1 + 𝑔𝑔11 + 𝑔𝑔2
�




�1 + 𝑔𝑔31 + 𝑔𝑔2
�






ln �1 + 𝑔𝑔11 + 𝑔𝑔2 
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 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 holds. And the weight of that kind 
of firms with middle range of growth rate decreases over time  
 







𝑔𝑔1 ∗ 𝑔𝑔3 > (𝑔𝑔2)2                                                  
𝑔𝑔1 − 𝑔𝑔2 + 𝑔𝑔2
𝑔𝑔2
>















𝑔𝑔1 − 𝑔𝑔2 > (𝑔𝑔2 − 𝑔𝑔3) �
𝑔𝑔2
𝑔𝑔3
�                                            
As 𝑔𝑔2 > 𝑔𝑔3, then 𝑔𝑔2 − 𝑔𝑔3 > 0 and 
𝑔𝑔2
𝑔𝑔3
> 1. Therefore, I can get the following 
inequality, 
(𝑔𝑔2 − 𝑔𝑔3) �
𝑔𝑔2
𝑔𝑔3
� > 𝑔𝑔2 − 𝑔𝑔3                                            
𝑔𝑔1 − 𝑔𝑔2 > 𝑔𝑔2 − 𝑔𝑔3 
𝑔𝑔1 + 𝑔𝑔3 > 2𝑔𝑔2                                                           
𝑔𝑔1 ∗ 𝑔𝑔3 + 𝑔𝑔1 + 𝑔𝑔3 > 2𝑔𝑔2 + (𝑔𝑔2)2  
1 + 𝑔𝑔1 ∗ 𝑔𝑔3 + 𝑔𝑔1 + 𝑔𝑔3 > 1 + 2𝑔𝑔2 + (𝑔𝑔2)2 
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The difference between growths of firms with first and second highest growth 
rate and the difference between growths of firms with second highest and lowest 
growth rate determine the proportion of that kind of firms with second highest 
growth rate over time. 
 
Weight of firms with lowest growth rate 
ln 𝜚𝜚31 > 0 
ln 𝜚𝜚32 > 0 
I get the inequalities, 
𝑊𝑊31(𝜚𝜚31)𝑆𝑆 ln 𝜚𝜚31 > 0 
(𝜚𝜚32)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊32 ln 𝜚𝜚32 > 0 
𝑊𝑊31(𝜚𝜚31)𝑆𝑆 ln 𝜚𝜚31 + (𝜚𝜚32)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊32 ln 𝜚𝜚32 > 0 




(−1)[𝑊𝑊31(𝜚𝜚31)𝑆𝑆 ln 𝜚𝜚31 + (𝜚𝜚32)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊32 ln 𝜚𝜚32]
[ 1 + (𝜚𝜚31)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊31 + (𝜚𝜚32)𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊32]2
< 0 
               






Appendix 5.1 The number of state-owned enterprises and private 
enterprises from 2003 to 2012 
The number of 
enterprises  
State-owned enterprises Private enterprises 
2012 8214 189289 
2011 8048 180612 
2010 10205 273259 
2009 10559 256031 
2008 11080 245850 
2007 11403 177080 
2006 15898 149736 
2005 18138 123820 
2004 24866 119357 
2003 24558 67607 






Appendix 5.2 The number of large-medium sized enterprises from 
2003 to 2012 

















Appendix 5.3 The value of outputs by R&D activities in 
large-medium sized enterprises in terms of state-owned and private 
enterprises 
The value of outputs caused by R&D in 
large-medium sized enterprises (10 thousands 
yuan) 
State-owned 
enterprises Private enterprises 
2008 224162481 45144590.5 
2009 252978363.8 58637200.6 
2010 290667158 85120865.7 












































































Poof 5.3 Proof of Proposition 3 
According to Function (4.11), the trend of growth rate of each type firms is the 





































































































� (𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆)2 > 0 
    𝑔𝑔∗𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 −
1
2
𝜘𝜘𝑖𝑖 > 0    
If 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆

















− 𝜋𝜋Ω𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆2 < 0 




The growth rate of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs increases over time. 
If 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆













> πΩ𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆2  
3𝑔𝑔∗𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1∗
?̌?𝐴𝑆𝑆−1
− 𝜋𝜋Ω𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆2 > 0 





















> πΩ𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆2  
3𝑔𝑔∗𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1∗
?̌?𝐴𝑆𝑆−1
− 𝜋𝜋Ω𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆2 > 0 




The growth rate of SOEs, LPEs and SMEs increases over time. 
If 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
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Proof 6.1 The proof of Equation (6.6) 
















































































2𝜖𝜖−1 , then the following 
equation can be worked out, 
𝑘𝑘2
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And it is also know, then the following equation can be worked out, 
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Then the ratio of 𝑘𝑘2
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And because 𝑗𝑗 < 1
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Overall, The probability of imitating advanced technology from technology 















In this chapter, the geometric mean of domestic technology causing growth rate 
in each period is introduced to calculated accumulated technology level in last 
period,  
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 = (1 + 𝑃𝑃�)𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−2 
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−2 = (1 + 𝑃𝑃�)𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−3 
⋮ 
𝐴𝐴1 = (1 + 𝑃𝑃�)𝐴𝐴0 
Therefore, 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆−1 = (1 + 𝑃𝑃�)𝑆𝑆−1𝐴𝐴0. 𝐴𝐴0  is initial domestic technology level. And it 
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The growth rate of research labor input 𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆 is,  





Because 𝑗𝑗 < 1
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𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛(1 + 𝑃𝑃�), then 
1 − 𝑗𝑗 − 𝜒𝜒 > 0 
















𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛(1 + 𝑃𝑃�), then 
1 − 𝑗𝑗 − 𝜒𝜒 > 0 
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